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Chapter 1:

Introduction

Since the mid-1970s, obesity has rapidly increased among U.S. consumers.
Approximately two out of three adults are either overweight or obese (U.S. Department
of Agricultural, 2016b). The high prevalence of obesity is a public health concern due to
the high costs incurred by individuals and society. Obesity increases the risk for chronic
diseases such as diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, musculoskeletal disorders, and cancer
(World Health Organization, 2016). In 2008 dollars, the direct cost of obesity regarding
medical expenditure was $147 billion (Finkelstein, Trogdon, Cohen, & Dietz, 2009).
Food-Away-From-Home (FAFH), secondary eating, and time preferences are three of
many factors blamed for obesity (Cawley, 2015; Rosin, 2008). This dissertation
investigates these factors in three essays.
1.1.

The Ability to Eat Food-Away-From-Home and Still Eat Healthy
FAFH consumption has rapidly increased since 1970. The proportion of food

expenditure spent on FAFH increased from 25.9% in 1970 to 43.1% in 2012 (U.S.
Department of Agricultural, 2016a). Previous research has attributed FAFH to poor diet
quality in terms of high caloric intake (Beydoun, Powell, & Wang, 2009; J. K. Binkley,
2008; Bowman & Vinyard, 2004; Lin & Cuthrie, 2012; Mancino, Todd, & Lin, 2009;
Taveras et al., 2005; Todd, Mancino, & Lin, 2010). The high demand as well as the high
caloric intake associated with FAFH have led to the identification of FAFH as a factor
that contributes to obesity. Although FAFH is high in calories, consumers might attempt
to reduce caloric intake during other meals. To that end, Essay I tests whether consumers
compensate for the high caloric intake typically associated with FAFH. The analysis uses
data from the 2009-10 National Health and Nutritional Examination Survey (NHANES).
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The NHANES is a food intake survey that provides detailed information for two nonconsecutive days of food consumption.
Essay I makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, Essay I discusses
how consumers change their behaviors on a meal-by-meal basis. For example, if a person
eats an away from home breakfast, the analysis determines how his or her behavior
changes during lunch and dinner to compensate for the high calories of the FAFH
breakfast. The first essay also elaborates on the cognitive aspects of the compensating
behavior. There is a consensus among consumers that FAFH is less nutritious than food
cooked at home. Nonetheless, consumers demand FAFH because of price, taste,
convenience, or socializing. We use the theory of cognitive dissonance to explain how
negative beliefs about FAFH, which are contrary to the consumers’ actions of eating
FAFH, create a state of cognitive dissonance. To resolve cognitive dissonance,
consumers compensate for FAFH by changing their behaviors during other meals.
1.2.

The Mindlessness and the Mindfulness of Secondary Eating
Secondary eating is defined as eating while doing something else, such as reading

or watching TV. While engaging in secondary eating, consumers might not be able to
closely monitor the amount of food, leading to overeating and obesity (Wansink, 2007).
Since the 1970s, the trend of secondary eating time has paralleled the trend of obesity,
and secondary eating has been thus blamed for obesity. The second essay tests the effect
of secondary eating on obesity. Studies that investigate the effect of secondary eating
assume that secondary eating similarly affects every consumer. The contribution that the
second essay makes to the literature is to relax this assumption, identifying situations
when secondary eating increases body weight (termed “mindless secondary eating”) and
2

when secondary eating decreases body weight (termed “mindful secondary eating”). We
hypothesize that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on obesity.
Maintaining a sedentary lifestyle increases the odds of mindless secondary eating. On the
contrary, maintaining an active lifestyle decreases the chances of mindless secondary
eating.
Essay II uses data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). A subsample of
participants from the Current Population Survey (CPS) was randomly selected to provide
diaries of their activities for 24 hours, starting at 4:00 am the day before the interview.
The Eating and Health Module contains information on secondary eating. We use two
methods to account for lifestyle elements. The first method is to compare engagement in
sedentary activities as well as physical activities. For example, watching TV for 4 hours
increases the probability of mindless secondary eating as opposed to watching TV for
half an hour. The second method is to compare secondary eating during different types of
primary activities. In reality, secondary eating during working or driving might have a
different effect from secondary eating while watching TV.
1.3.
Validating the Use of Time Preference Proxies to Explain Effects on Health
Outcomes
Food consumption and health-related issues are intertemporal choices that reflect
trade-offs between immediate gratifications and future well-being. The rate of time
preferences indicates the extent to which consumers can delay benefits. Patient
individuals forgo present gratifications to obtain future benefits. Impatient people weigh
present gratifications more than future well-being, so they are unable to delay benefits.
To estimate the effect of time preferences on health outcomes, researchers either elicit the

3

rate of time preference using monetary present-future trade-off questionnaires or use
proxies. Essay III investigates the validity of using time preference proxies to estimate
the effects on health outcomes, determining if variations in elicited discount rates
correspond to variations in time preference proxies. The contribution of the third essay is
methodological: to provide researchers who are interested in determining the effect of
time preferences on health outcomes with guidance on how to measure time preferences.
The analysis uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79).
Before 2006, the NLSY79 provided information that can be used as proxies for time
preferences. In 2006, the NLSY79 included two hypothetical monetary trade-off
elicitation questions. The first question is over a month time horizon, and the second is
over a year time horizon. These two time frames for the elicitation questions allow for
investigating time preference proxies under the fixed exponential and hyperbolic
preferences.

4

Chapter 2:
2.1.

The Ability to Eat Food-Away-From-Home and Still Eat Healthy

Introduction
Since 1970, U.S. consumer diets have shown an increased demand for Food-

Away-From-Home (FAFH). FAFH expenditure rose from 25.9% of total food
expenditure in 1970 to 43.1% by 2012 (U.S. Department of Agricultural, 2016a).
Because of the high caloric intake, FAFH tends to be blamed for the obesity epidemic in
the United States (Beydoun et al., 2009; J. K. Binkley, 2008; Bowman & Vinyard, 2004;
Lin & Cuthrie, 2012; Mancino et al., 2009; Taveras et al., 2005; Todd et al., 2010).
Approximately two adults in three are either overweight or obese (U.S. Department of
Agricultural, 2016b).
Health advocates have called for FAFH regulations to improve people’s diets and
reduce obesity, in particular after FAFH became readily available (Cutler, Glaeser, &
Shapiro, 2003), unavoidable for many reasons such as business meetings or social
gatherings taking place at restaurants (Cohen & Bhatia, 2012), and increasingly tasty and
visually appealing (Blechert, Klackl, Miedl, & Wilhelm, 2016). However, regulations
focusing on FAFH are controversial. On the one hand, proponents of regulations argue
that consumers lack both the ability to make healthy choices when eating away from
home and the willpower to compensate during other meals for the excessive caloric
intake associated with FAFH (Cohen & Bhatia, 2012). On the other hand, opponents of
regulations argue that consumers can compensate for FAFH during other meals
(Anderson & Matsa, 2011; Cutler et al., 2003). In order to illuminate the link between
FAFH and obesity and the justification for such regulations, this paper elaborates on
consumers’ beliefs and behaviors relating to FAFH and tests whether consumers
5

compensate by changing behavior during other meals for the high calories associated
with FAFH.
Examples of FAFH regulations intended to develop better eating patterns and
reduce obesity include: 1) The fast food ban in south Los Angeles, where obesity is
highly prevalent, prohibiting the establishment of a stand-alone fast food restaurant
(Sturm & Cohen, 2009); 2) The Healthy Eating Option Program in Watsonville,
California, in which a permit approval for a new restaurant is conditional on providing
healthier meals (Watsonville Municipal Code, 2010) 1; 3) Standards for restaurant food
accompanied by toys in San Francisco, California (Otten et al., 2014) 2; and 4) The 2010
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which requires chain restaurants with at least
20 branches to provide nutritional information (Swartz, Braxton, & Viera, 2011) so
consumers can make informed choices.
In addition to nutrition, other factors come into play when choosing a meal, such
as taste and convenience. In a survey of New Jersey households (Stewart, Blisard, &
Jolliffe, 2006), respondents were asked to rank their preferences for FAFH on a scale of 1
(less preferred) to 5 (highly preferred) in terms of taste, nutrition, and convenience. On
average, the responses were 4.5 for taste, 3.9 for nutrition, and 3.5 for convenience,
indicating that when consumers dine away from home, they think about taste and
convenience as important aspects of food consumption. Other studies drawn from the

1

The approval of a new permit requires getting at least 6 out of 19 points. For example, 2 points are
obtained by offering at least 4 choices of fruits or vegetables prepared in a low-fat way (e.g., green salad,
baked potato) (Sturm & Cohen, 2009).
2
For example, the maximum caloric intake per meal is 600 calories, and the maximum level of sodium per
meal is 640 mg (Otten et al., 2014).

6

household production theory emphasize the importance of the convenience of FAFH. The
assumption is that changes in socioeconomic factors, such as increased time at work,
increase the opportunity cost of time. Consequently, the shift in consumers’ preferences
toward consuming more FAFH reflects their demand for convenience. McCracken and
Brandt (1987) estimate the demand for FAFH based on the type of FAFH facilities
(restaurants, fast food, and other commercial establishments). Their results show a
significant effect of time value on FAFH expenditure. Yen (1993) finds that households
with higher income and working wives are more likely to consume FAFH. J. K. Binkley
(2006) and Stewart, Blisard, Bhuyan, and Nayga Jr (2004) also find hours worked outside
the house to positively affect the demand for FAFH.
Studies that consider the association between FAFH and high caloric intake may
ignore the ability of consumers to compensate for FAFH. Consumers sometimes act as if
they have a caloric budget (Variyam, 2005). The excessive calories corresponding to
FAFH are traded off at other meals. Cutler et al. (2003) explain that FAFH has no causal
effect on obesity because typically, if one eats FAFH, they will compensate by eating less
food later in the day. 3 Anderson and Matsa (2011) estimate the effect of FAFH on obesity
and test for the compensating behavior. For their identification strategy, Anderson and
Matsa (2011) use the placement of interstate highways in rural areas to obtain exogenous
variations in FAFH prices to explain variations in obesity. They claim there is no causal
effect of FAFH on obesity due to the compensatory behavior (Anderson & Matsa, 2011).
To test for the compensatory behavior, Anderson and Matsa (2011) consider the

3

Instead, Cutler et al. (2003) attribute the obesity epidemic to the low prices of FAFH wherein consumers
with hyperbolic discounting and high preferences for high calories are most affected by the low prices.
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difference between the effect of an away from home meal on the meal caloric intake and
the daily caloric intake. A substantial effect of FAFH on calories at the meal level and a
minimal effect on calories at the daily level demonstrates the compensating behavior. It
is, however, unclear how consumers change their behavior during other meals to
compensate for FAFH. For instance, if an away from home breakfast increases caloric
intake, how do consumers compensate for the breakfast’s excessive calories during lunch
and dinner?
This paper also examines consumers’ abilities to compensate for FAFH by
changing their behaviors during other meals. We contribute to the existing literature by
investigating how consumers change their behaviors on a meal-by-meal basis. For
example, if a person eats an away from home breakfast, the analysis tests if behavior
changes during lunch and dinner to compensate for the high calories from FAFH. We
also contribute to the existing literature by elaborating on the cognitive aspects of the
compensating behavior for FAFH. We use data from the 2009-10 National Health and
Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). The NHANES is food intake data in which
consumers provide information from two non-consecutive days about their food
consumption. The Consumer Behavior Phone Follow-up Module provides information
about consumers’ beliefs. There is a consensus among consumers that FAFH is less
nutritious than food cooked at home. Nonetheless, consumers demand FAFH because of
price, taste, convenience, or socializing. We implement the theory of cognitive
dissonance introduced by Festinger (1962) to explain how the negative beliefs about
FAFH that are contrary to the consumers’ actions of eating FAFH create a state of
cognitive dissonance. To resolve cognitive dissonance, we hypothesize that consumers
8

compensate for FAFH by changing behavior during other meals. The results support our
hypothesis of the compensating behavior. For example, an away from home breakfast
increases breakfast caloric intake by 378 calories, but consumers change their behavior
during lunch by reducing lunch calories by 149 calories.
We perform two robustness consistency tests of our results with the theory of
cognitive dissonance. We test the compensating behavior for the addictive components of
FAFH. FAFH is high in sugar, carbohydrates, fat, and salt (Lin & Cuthrie, 2012; Todd et
al., 2010), which are addictive components (Gearhardt, Corbin, & Brownell, 2009; SotoEscageda et al., 2016). The implication is that if addiction prevents consumers from
compensating for FAFH during other meals, the results are inconsistent with the theory of
cognitive dissonance. We also perform a placebo test. It is impossible to imagine that
drinking plain water has the same effect as FAFH. If so, then the results cannot be
explained by the theory of cognitive dissonance. These tests indicate that our results are
consistent with the theory of cognitive dissonance.
The results suggest redirecting policies toward increasing the efficacy of the
compensatory behavior rather than restricting the availability of FAFH. There is no single
type of food that can be the only assessment of diet quality. Eating FAFH does not
automatically entail a poor diet, and eating food cooked at home does not ensure a better
diet. The balance between foods from all sources due to the compensatory behavior is a
better and more effective assessment of diet quality. The remainder of this essay is
divided into five sections. Section 2.2 presents the data used for the analysis. Section 2.3
discusses the model. Section 2.4 reports the results. Section 2.5 checks the robustness of
our results, and Section 2.6 concludes.
9

2.2.

Data
We utilize data from the 2009-10 National Health and Nutritional Examination

Survey (NHANES). For two non-consecutive days, the NHANES collected information
on food intake. Consumers were personally interviewed on day one. On day two,
consumers were interviewed by phone three to ten days later. The NHANES asked
consumers about individual food intake regarding the type of food they had, from where
it was obtained (e.g., a store, a table service restaurant, a fast food place), the name of the
meal (e.g., breakfast, lunch, dinner), and the intake day of the week. Thus, the NHANES
could calculate the amount of caloric intake for each item reported.
The Consumer Behavior Phone Follow-up Module provides information on
beliefs about fast food and restaurant food in comparison to food cooked at home, so we
restrict the sample to consumers from whom we could retain information on their beliefs
regarding FAFH. The Consumer Behavior Phone Follow-up Module asks consumers the
following questions:

“Do you buy food from fast food or pizza places because it
is cheaper than foods cooked at home?”
“Do you buy food from fast food or pizza places because the
foods there are more nutritious than cooking at home?”
“Do you buy food from fast food or pizza places because the
foods there taste better than foods cooked at home?”
“Do you buy food from fast food or pizza places because it
is more convenient than cooking at home?”
“Do you eat at fast food or pizza places instead of cooking
at home to socialize with family and friends?”

10

Consumers also answer the same questions regarding restaurant food, so we
limited the analysis to FAFH from these two sources. The final sample consists of 7,538
observations. Panel A of Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of consumers’ beliefs
relating to FAFH. On average, only 2% of consumers consider fast food is more
nutritious than food cooked at home, while only 4% of consumers think restaurant food is
more nutritious than food cooked at home. In general, consumers are more likely to
associate fast food with convenience and low prices and more likely to associate
restaurant food with taste and socializing. Consumers’ behaviors regarding FAFH are
reported in Panel B of Table 2.1. The average daily FAFH consumption is equal to 0.6
meal, where the weekly FAFH consumption averages 4 meals. 4
This link between beliefs and behaviors relating to FAFH reveals a general
agreement among consumers that FAFH is less nutritious than food at home, but
consumers continue to consume FAFH. We implement the theory of cognitive dissonance
to explain how the inconsistency between beliefs and behaviors creates a state of
cognitive dissonance. We hypothesize that consumers compensate for FAFH by changing
behavior during other meals to resolve the dissonance.
Compensating for FAFH implies ingesting more calories when eating out, and
then changing behavior during other meals, so we limit our sample to the three major
meals, breakfast, lunch, and dinner. From an economic standpoint, the excessive calories
associated with FAFH meals are optimal choices (Anderson & Matsa, 2011). This

4

The average daily FAFH consumption is calculated from the two-non-consecutive day of food intake. The
weekly FAFH consumption is calculated from consumers’ responses to how many meals not home
prepared consumed a week in the Diet Behavior and Nutrition Section in the National Health and
Nutritional Examination Survey.
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rationale is underlined by the assumption that the portion size of an away from home
meal is larger than that cooked at home (Anderson & Matsa, 2011; Jeitschko &
Pecchenino, 2006). Food cooked at home involves a sunk cost of food preparation and a
price for groceries, while eating away from home involves only a sunk cost. At home, a
consumer ingests calories until the marginal utility is equal to the price paid for groceries.
When dining away from home, the consumer ingests calories until either finishing the
meal, which is relatively larger, or being fully satiated at zero marginal utility. Hence, at
the margin, consumers eat more food away from home than they do at home.
The excessive caloric consumption when eating FAFH is reported in Figures 2.13. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the effect of an away from home breakfast on caloric intake.
The vertical axis is the average breakfast calories. The left bar is the average number of
calories conditional on a food at home breakfast, and the right bar is the average number
of calories conditional on a FAFH breakfast. In the calculation of the average breakfast
calories conditional on an at home breakfast, we omit consumers who skipped breakfast
to avoid an upward bias of the effect of FAFH on caloric intake. On average, consumers
ingest 377 calories from an at home breakfast, but they ingest 692 calories from FAFH
breakfast. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the effect of an away from home lunch. Lunch at
home averages 525 calories while lunch away from home averages 803 calories.
Similarly, at home dinner increases caloric intake by 730 on average compared to an
away from home dinner, which increases caloric intake by 988 calories on average as
shown in Figure 2.3.
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2.3.

Model
The model will first explain the theory of cognitive dissonance and its

implications to determine the compensating behavior for FAFH by changing behavior
during other meals. Then, the model will present the empirical counterpart to test our
hypothesis of the compensating behavior.
2.3.1. Theoretical Model: Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
The theory of cognitive dissonance was developed by the social psychologist
Leon Festinger (1962). Cognitive dissonance is defined as disutility that occurs when
beliefs contradict behaviors. This theory hypothesizes that consumers tend to reject the
state of cognitive dissonance and take steps to achieve cognitive consonance. 5 To resolve
dissonance, consumers can change beliefs or behaviors or add a new cognition. For
example, a person knows that smoking is bad but continues to smoke. He or she can
resolve dissonance by thinking that the negative impacts of smoking are overstated,
quitting smoking, or thinking that he or she will gain weight when quitting. Economists
and other social scientists have implemented the theory of cognitive dissonance. For
example, Akerlof and Dickens (1982) apply the theory of cognitive dissonance in their
discussion of safety regulations in hazardous jobs. 6 Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, and
Miller (1992) use the theory of cognitive dissonance in their discussion of water
conservation.

5

Consonance is the terminology used by Festinger. However, it is similar to cognitive consistency or
cognitive equilibrium (Festinger, 1962).
6
Akerlof and Dickens (1982) also use the theory of cognitive dissonance to discuss sources of innovation,
advertising, social security, and economic theory of crime as other potential applications of the theory of
cognitive dissonance.
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The theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that the level of dissonance is
proportional to the importance of the conflicting cognition, so that the greater the
dissonance, the greater the actions to resolve it. Consumers consider a set of cognitions,
nutrition, price, taste, convenience and socializing when eating FAFH. In general, price
and nutrition can be the conflicting cognitions, but the investigation of offsetting calories
considers nutrition as the conflicting cognition. When price is inconsistent with eating
out, consumers do not necessarily resolve dissonance by reducing caloric intake during
other meals. They might alter their behavior by consuming cheaper food regardless of
calories.
There is a general agreement that FAFH is less nutritious than food at home, but
consumers still eat it. The level of dissonance will be proportional to the importance of
nutrition. If nutrition is important to consumers, dissonance is higher, and so is the
intensity of their actions to compensate for FAFH during other meals to resolve the
dissonance. In contrast, if nutrition is not important, dissonance is minimal, and
consumers do not compensate for FAFH. Overall, the empirical analysis of estimating the
compensating behavior will demonstrate the disagreement between nutrition and eating
FAFH.
2.3.2. Empirical Model
To show how consumers would compensate for FAFH in an ideal world would
require collecting a random sample. Consumers in this sample would have either positive
or negative beliefs regarding the nutrition of FAFH in comparison to food at home.
Those with negative beliefs would be assigned to a treatment group, and those with
positive beliefs would be assigned to a control group. When all consumers ate FAFH, we
14

would expect dissonance to be higher, and the compensatory behavior to be more
pronounced for consumers in the treatment group than for those in the control group. In
reality, such a randomized experiment is costly to conduct and might not be
representative.
The dependent variable is the caloric intake at a given meal, breakfast, lunch, and
dinner as shown in Equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, respectively. 7 (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005)
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005)
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005)

𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝛽𝛽01 + 𝛽𝛽11 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽21 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽31 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ,

(2.1)

𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝛽𝛽02 + 𝛽𝛽12 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽22 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽32 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 ,

(2.2)

𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝛽𝛽03 + 𝛽𝛽13 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽23 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽33 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘3 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 .

(2.3)

where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes calories ingested by consumer 𝑖𝑖 on day 𝑡𝑡 for meal 𝑚𝑚, 𝐵𝐵 denotes an
away from home breakfast, 𝐿𝐿 denotes an away from home lunch, 𝐷𝐷 denotes an away

from home dinner, 𝑋𝑋 denotes other controls, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 denotes unobserved heterogeneity, and 𝜖𝜖

denotes the error term. 𝛽𝛽’s are the coefficients to be estimated. 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 are the subscripts
for consumers and the day of food intake; 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁𝑁 and 𝑡𝑡 is equal to 1 for the first
day of food intake and 2 for the second day of food intake. 𝑚𝑚 = 1,2, and 3 are for
7

The percentages of those who did not have breakfast, lunch, and dinner are 17, 25, and 10%, respectively.
We treat skipping a meal as true zero, not as censored.
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breakfast, lunch, and dinner, respectively. 𝑘𝑘 is the subscript for other control variables’

coefficients, 𝑘𝑘 > 3. Since consumers tend to eat differently on weekends (McCracken &
Brandt, 1987), we add a dummy variable that equals 1 if the day of intake was either

Friday, Saturday, or Sunday. Some days, consumers might experience a different eating
pattern such as when traveling, so we control for a day fixed effect (whether day one or
two).
Estimating equations 2.1-3 using OLS provides inconsistent estimates due to
sample selection bias that results from the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity
and independent variables. 8 Those who have strong preferences for high-calorie meals
tend to eat more FAFH and compensate less. Failing to control for unobserved
heterogeneity will underestimate the compensatory behavior. We estimate equations 2.13 using a fixed effect model to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 9
Breaking down the calories eaten for breakfast, lunch, and dinner allows
determining the effect of FAFH on caloric intake occasion within equations and allows
determining how consumers change their behavior during other meals. Another
advantage is to investigate the ability of consumers to pre-compensate and postcompensate for FAFH. For example, can a consumer pre-compensate for an away from
home lunch at breakfast and post-compensate at dinner?

8
We do not estimate equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 as a system of equations because we have the same set of
independent variables in each equation. Thus, the results of the system of equations are similar to those of
estimating the equations separately (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).
9
Equations 2.1-3 can be estimated using a first difference OLS. However, since each panel has only two
observations a fixed effect estimator and first difference estimator generate the same results (Cameron &
Trivedi, 2005).

16

Different demographic groups exert different eating patterns regarding FAFH.
Male and obese consumers tend to eat more FAFH than female and non-obese consumers
(J. K. Binkley, 2006; McCracken & Brandt, 1987). Mancino et al. (2009) estimate the
effect of FAFH on caloric intake for males compared to females, and obese consumers
compared to the healthy weight consumers. Their results indicate that the effect is higher
among male and obese consumers. We estimate equations 2.1-3, separately, for males
and females, and separately, for obese and healthy weight consumers. We expect
dissonance to be higher among males and obese, as well as the compensatory behavior. 10
To measure obesity, we use the Body Mass Index (BMI), defined as weight in kilograms
divided by the square of height in meter (kg/m2). 11 Obese consumers are those with BMI
≥ 30, and healthy weight consumers are those with BMI < 25. Panel C of Table 2.1
provides summary statistics for these groups. On average, the sample is 48% male, 36%
obese and 31% healthy weight. The share of obese consumers compared to the share of
healthy weight consumers indicates the high prevalence of obesity.
The frequency of eating FAFH is expected to affect dissonance and compensating
for FAFH during other meals. We expect consumers with a high frequency of eating
FAFH to experience greater levels of cognitive dissonance and compensate more. The
NHANES provides information on the frequency of the weekly away from home meals
consumed, with a median equal to three FAFH meal/week. Since there is no measure
calling for the high frequency of eating FAFH, we consider eating more than three FAFH

10

Other groups that are less likely to eat FAFH might also compensate more. For example, age and
education are negatively correlated with FAFH (J. K. Binkley, 2006; Stewart et al., 2004), but as
consumers grow older or obtain more knowledge, they are expected to compensate more.
11
Weight and high are measured, not self-reported.
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meals a week as defining the high frequency of FAFH, and eating fewer than three FAFH
meal/week as defining the low frequency of eating FAFH.
2.4.

Results
The results indicate that people compensate for FAFH by changing their

behaviors during other meals. In Table 2.2, we estimate equations 2.1-3 using OLS as
appearing in columns 1-3 and a fixed effect estimator as appearing in columns 4-6. The
dependent variable is the number of calories ingested at a given meal. To compensate for
FAFH, consumers would simply ingest more calories when eating FAFH. The results in
Table 2.2 show evidence of overeating. FAFH increases breakfast energy by 378 calories,
lunch energy by 442 calories, and dinner energy by 394 calories. To test our hypothesis
of the compensating behavior, we compare the effect of FAFH meals across regressions
as reported in Table 2.2. On average, consumers forgo 149 calories at lunch to
compensate for FAFH breakfast. To compensate for FAFH lunch, consumers forgo 37
calories at breakfast and 144 calories for dinner. Because the NHANES does not provide
food intake information for consecutive days, we cannot determine post-compensation
for an away from home dinner, although the results show evidence of pre-compensating
for a FAFH dinner by 79 calories during lunch.
For breakfast and lunch equations, the OLS results underestimate the
compensatory behavior because consumers’ preferences for high caloric intake are
negatively correlated with their compensatory behavior. We use a fixed effect estimator
to account for the unobserved heterogeneity. For all three equations, we perform the
Hausman test to determine correlations between the unobserved heterogeneity and
independent variables. For breakfast and lunch equations, we reject the null hypothesis of
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no correlation. However, for dinner, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation
between the independent variables and the unobserved heterogeneity, though this might
be because of our inability to determine post-compensation for FAFH dinners.
We hypothesized that consumers compensate for FAFH by changing behavior
during other meals. The results provide evidence for the compensating behavior.
Consumers either pre-compensate or post-compensate or both. Pre-compensation for
FAFH is not a surprising result because there are many situations when eating FAFH is
planned, such as social meetings held in restaurants. Expecting to eat out does not
necessarily imply that consumers know in advance the exact meal they will eat. As a
result, post-compensation for FAFH is greater in magnitude than pre-compensation.
The results indicate partial compensation for FAFH: There are two reasons why
these results do not state full compensation. First, reducing caloric intake during other
meals is not the only mean to offset FAFH. A person can engage in physical activities to
make up for the excessive calories. Second, not all restaurants provide nutritional
information, unlike eating at home where most food items come with nutritional labels
and consumers even control all ingredients. This issue of asymmetric information away
from home might make offsetting FAFH insufficient.
Some might relate the compensating behavior to satiety and argue that when
exceeding the desired caloric intake due to eating FAFH, satiety makes people reduces
energy consumption in the following meals (Anderson & Matsa, 2011). However, the
theory of cognitive dissonance is superior to satiety in demonstrating the compensating
behavior. Satiety might explain post-compensating for FAFH but cannot justify pre-
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compensating. Our results based on the theory of cognitive dissonance show that
consumers either pre-compensate or post-compensate or both. Satiety also differs based
on protein, carbohydrates, and fat, restricting offsetting FAFH to meals that contain
highly satiating components (protein > carbohydrates > fat) (Chambers, McCrickerd, &
Yeomans, 2015). Nonetheless, the theory of cognitive dissonance does not impose any
restriction on different combinations of protein, carbohydrates, and fat.
The results in Table 2.2 also show that FAFH compensation occurs either at the
immediate following or the immediate previous meal. For example, eating an away from
home breakfast has a negative and significant effect on lunch but not on dinner. The
reason is that choosing a meal is a difficult process, which involves many factors such as
biological factors (e.g., hunger), economic factors (e.g., income), social factors (e.g.,
family, religion), and knowledge (e.g., beliefs) (The European Food Information Council,
2005). This difficulty might deplete the cognitive ability to compensate for a meal that
was eaten far earlier in the day.
The differences between males and females regarding compensating for FAFH
are reported in Table 2.3. Columns 1-3 indicate the three meal occasions for males and
columns 4-6 indicate the three meal occasions for females. Males overeat when eating a
FAFH breakfast by 413 calories but compensate for it during lunch by 191 calories.
When eating a FAFH lunch, males overeat by 518 calories but pre-compensate by 41
calories during breakfast and post-compensate during dinner by 173 calories. For males, a
FAFH dinner also increases caloric intake by 480 calories but decreases lunch calories by
104 as an indication of pre-compensation. Similarly, for females, FAFH exerts a positive
effect on breakfast, lunch, and dinner energy consumption by 325, 362, and 301 calories,
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respectively. However, females pre-compensate for a FAFH lunch during breakfast by 31
calories and post-compensate during dinner by 106 calories. Females pre-compensate for
a FAFH dinner during lunch by 43 calories. The results in Table 2.3 have the expected
patterns. As predicted, the compensating behavior is more pronounced in males than
females for two reasons. First, being a male is associated with higher FAFH
consumption. Second, males ingest more calories than females when eating FAFH. Both
reasons arouse cognitive dissonance and intensify the actions of compensating for FAFH.
Given the accusation that FAFH contributes to obesity, we estimate the
compensatory behavior for consumers with a healthy weight (BMI < 25) and obese (BMI
≥ 30) as appearing in Table 2.4. Regardless of the weight status, consumers ingest more
calories when eating away from home, indicating a consistency with the economic
justification of overeating away from home mentioned earlier. Because of the high
association of FAFH with obesity, we expected the compensatory behavior to be more
pronounced among obese consumers. The results in Table 2.4 meet our expectations.
Obese consumers compensate for FAFH eaten at breakfast, lunch, and dinner, whereas
healthy weight consumers only compensate for FAFH lunch.
Finally, we estimate differences in the compensatory behavior based on the
frequency of eating FAFH. High frequent FAFH consumers experience a higher level of
dissonance than low frequent consumers do. We estimate equations 2.1-3 for low
frequent FAFH consumers, eating fewer than three FAFH meal/week, and high frequent
FAFH consumers, eating more than three FAFH meal/week. The results in Table 2.5
meet our expectations. High frequent FAFH patrons excessively ingest more calories
when eating away from home than low frequent FAFH consumers do. Nevertheless, the
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compensatory behavior is more pronounced in high frequent FAFH patrons. For example,
high frequent FAFH consumers compensate for FAFH breakfast by 191 calories while
low frequent FAFH consumers do not compensate for FAFH breakfast.
2.5.

Robustness check
FAFH is high in sugar, carbohydrates, fat, and salt (Lin & Cuthrie, 2012; Todd et

al., 2010). These components are addictive (Gearhardt et al., 2009; Soto-Escageda et al.,
2016). If addiction prevents consumers from compensating for FAFH during other meals,
the results mentioned in the earlier section of the paper cannot be consistent with the
theory of cognitive dissonance. There might be a systemic error, even after controlling
for the individual fixed effect, which is correlated with FAFH meals and differently
affects energy levels for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. We estimate equations 2.1-3 for fat,
sugar, carbohydrates, and sodium to determine whether addiction prevents the
compensatory behavior. Fat, sugar, and carbohydrates are measured in grams (gm).
Sodium is measured in milligrams (mg).
Table 2.6 demonstrates the results of compensating for FAFH fat. The dependent
variable is the amount of fat in gm. One gm of fat has 9 calories. For all three meals,
consumers increase fat consumption when eating FAFH but compensate for the high fat
consumption associated with FAFH. For example, FAFH breakfast increases fat
consumption by 20 gm but consumers compensate for it by eating 6 gm less of fat during
lunch. The results of compensating for FAFH sugar appear in Table 2.7, where 1 gm of
sugar contains 4 calories. For breakfast, lunch, and dinner, consumers ingest more sugar
when eating FAFH but compensate for the excess amount of sugar associated with FAFH
during other meals. To illustrate, FAFH breakfast increases the sugar consumption by 12
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gm. However, consumers compensate for it by reducing the amount of sugar by 7 gm
during lunch.
Table 2.8 shows the results for compensating for FAFH carbohydrates, in which a
gm of carbohydrate contains 4 calories. For all meals, the results indicate that consumers
ingest more carbohydrates when eating FAFH and compensate for their overconsumption
of carbohydrates during other meals in the day. For instance, when eating FAFH
breakfast, consumers increase carbohydrate consumption by 33 gm but compensate for it
later during lunch by eating 18 gm less of carbohydrates. The results of compensating for
FAFH sodium appear in Table 2.9. For all three meal occasions, consumers’ behaviors
demonstrate an overconsumption of sodium as a result of eating FAFH as well as the
compensating behavior by altering their consumption patterns during other meals. For
example, eating a FAFH breakfast increases sodium consumption by 771 mg, but
consumers reduce lunch sodium by 332 mg.
Compensating for FAFH fat, sugar, carbohydrates, and sodium indicates that
addiction does not prevent consumers from altering their behavior during other meals.
The results are consistent with the theory of cognitive dissonance, and not due to a
systemic error that is correlated with FAFH meals and has different effects on breakfast,
lunch, and dinner energy consumption. Furthermore, we run a placebo test as appearing
in Table 2.10. The dependent variable is the number of calories consumed at a particular
meal. It is impossible to imagine that drinking water has the same effect as FAFH. We
use the amount of plain water measured in gm instead of a FAFH breakfast in equation
2.1, instead of a FAFH lunch in equation 2.2, and instead of a FAFH dinner in the
equation 2.3. Hence, there is no effect of water on energy consumption. In sum, our
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placebo test shows more evidence that FAFH, which is contrary to beliefs, creates a state
of cognitive dissonance.
2.6.

Conclusion
Food-Away-From-Home (FAFH) appears to be of poor diet quality because it is

high in calories; thus, it is often blamed for the high prevalence of obesity in the United
States. We hypothesize that consumers compensate for FAFH by changing their
behaviors during other meals. To test this hypothesis, we use data from the 2009-10
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). The results support our
hypothesis of the compensating behavior. Consumers are able to reduce energy
consumption during other meals to trade off the excessive caloric intake typically
associated with FAFH. Consumers can change their behaviors either before or after
eating FAFH or both. For example, consumers change their behaviors during breakfast
and dinner to compensate for FAFH lunch.
Restricting FAFH is less warranted when consumers can compensate for the
excessive caloric intake from the consumption of FAFH during other meals. FAFH
restrictions might affect consumers’ welfare for four reasons. First, restricting FAFH
implies considering only nutrition. Besides nutrition, a food shopper simultaneously
considers other aspects of food consumption such as price, taste, and convenience,
weighs the utility of each, and then considers the one that gives him or her the most
utility. For example, imagine that a health-conscious consumer forgets to bring lunch to
work. The only options are to return home and get it or to buy a high-calorie meal from
the workplace cafeteria. In this situation, convenience will outweigh nutrition more if the
opportunity cost of time is high, and the consumer will offset the high caloric intake of
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lunch by eating a lower-calorie dinner later at home. Second, restricting FAFH implies
revising the advancements in food processing, which might be socially desirable
(Cawley, 2015). Third, there is no single type of food that can be the only assessment of
diet quality. Eating FAFH does not automatically entail a poor diet, and eating food at
home does not ensure a better diet. Finally, food environment regulations such as zoning,
taxing, or portion control (Sturm & Cohen, 2009) are not anticipated to become
implemented nationwide because these regulations interfere with consumers’ rights to
decide on their health and restrict the rights of businesses to expand and differentiate
themselves. For instance, the state of Mississippi passed a law in 2013 that prevented
controlling food portions (Fox News, 2013).
We also elucidate the cognitive aspects of the compensating behavior. Consumers
believe that FAFH is less nutritious than food at home, but they still demand it because of
price, taste, convenience, or socializing. We implement the theory of cognitive
dissonance introduced by Festinger (1962) to explain how the negative beliefs about
FAFH conflict with consumers’ actions of eating FAFH and thus, create a state of
cognitive dissonance. To resolve cognitive dissonance, consumers compensate for
consumption of FAFH by altering behavior during other meals.
Since the compensating behavior is an action to resolve dissonance, we suggest
redirecting policies toward manipulating cognitive dissonance rather than restricting the
availability of FAFH. As an illustration of dissonance manipulation, in their discussion of
water conservation, Dickerson et al. (1992) arouse cognitive dissonance in their
experiment subjects, varying their mindfulness in water wasting behavior and their procommitment to society by asking them to inspire others to conserve water. The pro25

committed and mindful subjects experienced a greater dissonance and thus took shorter
showers as opposed to the uncommitted subjects.
Increasing the intensity of dissonance after eating FAFH to induce the
compensatory behavior is one avenue policymakers should consider to promote healthy
eating and reduce obesity. Regulations that are based on dissonance manipulation can
nudge consumers to improve their dietary choices without dictating their choices (R. H.
Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). Mandating the nutritional information on menus at restaurants
and fast food establishments can influence dissonance. Even if consumers do not use the
nutritional information to decide on what to eat, just knowing the number of calories
ingested can arouse dissonance after eating and increase the efficacy of compensating for
FAFH. Menu labeling could also be supplemented by providing the nutritional
information as a reference for a meal purchased, such as printing the nutritional
information on the back of the receipt.
A limitation of this study is its focus on whether or not consumers compensate for
the high caloric intake from FAFH, without assessing the efficacy of their compensation.
To gauge the effectiveness of compensating would require information on food intake
and physical activities for consecutive days to account for calorie consumption as well as
expenditure. Not considering the availability of healthy food is also another limitation.
Individuals who do not have enough access to healthy food like those who live in food
desert areas might compensate less for FAFH. These limitations are left for future
research.

26

Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the analysis of compensating for Food-Away-FromHome
Variables
Mean
S.D.
A: Beliefs relating to Food-Away-From-Home
Fast food/pizza more nutritious
0.02
0.15
Fast food/pizza cheaper than cooking
0.16
0.36
Fast food/pizza tastes better
0.15
0.36
Fast food/pizza more convenient
0.86
0.34
Eat at fast food places to socialize
0.47
0.50
Restaurant food more nutritious
0.04
0.19
Restaurant food cheaper than cooking
0.06
0.23
Restaurant food tastes better
0.33
0.47
Restaurant food more convenient
0.69
0.46
Eat at a restaurant to socialize
0.85
0.36
B: Actions relating to Food-Away-From-Home
Daily away from home meals
0.58
0.71
Away from home breakfast
0.08
0.27
Away from home lunch
0.24
0.43
Away from home dinner
0.26
0.44
Weekly away from home meals
4.00
3.92
C: Subgroups
Male
0.48
0.50
Healthy weight
0.31
0.46
Obese
0.36
0.48
Observations are weighted using the NHANES sample weights.
N = 7,538
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Figure 2.1: The effect of an away from home breakfast on caloric intake

Without FAFH breakfast

With FAFH breakfast
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Figure 2.2: The effect of an away from home lunch on caloric intake
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Figure 2.3: The effect of an away from home dinner on caloric intake

Without FAFH dinner

With FAFH dinner
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Table 2.2: The results of compensating for Food-Away-From-Home calories during other meals
OLS
Energy (kcal)
Variables
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
Breakfast
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Away from home breakfast
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385.299***
-112.258***
5.929
(23.052)
(25.814)
(36.245)
Away from home lunch
-33.377***
456.021***
-125.054***
(10.654)
(18.193)
(19.683)
Away from home dinner
-36.719***
-52.524***
364.830***
(10.195)
(15.026)
(23.598)
Weekend
38.165***
-11.979
-9.846
(10.405)
(13.517)
(18.011)
Day fixed effect
-39.023***
-14.567
-7.040
(8.614)
(11.918)
(15.286)
Constant
328.436***
388.000***
667.607***
(8.978)
(10.985)
(14.825)
Observations
7,538
7,538
7,538
R-squared
0.116
0.196
0.089
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

378.490***
(27.364)
-36.516**
(14.737)
-12.737
(13.277)
45.850***
(9.800)
-39.355***
(8.609)
320.270***
(6.899)
7,538
0.143

Fixed Effect
Energy (kcal)
Lunch
(5)

Dinner
(6)

-149.248***
(39.111)
441.819***
(25.252)
-78.830***
(21.050)
-13.348
(14.939)
-14.615
(11.910)
401.707***
(9.579)
7,538
0.203

-68.706
(47.822)
-143.969***
(29.179)
394.283***
(30.903)
6.308
(17.770)
-8.122
(15.296)
663.660***
(12.842)
7,538
0.124

Table 2.3: The results of compensating for Food-Away-From-Home calories during other meals among male and female consumers
Males
Females
Variables
Energy (kcal)
Energy (kcal)
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Away from home breakfast
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412.966***
-191.251***
-74.394
(38.113)
(54.973)
(71.647)
Away from home lunch
-41.468*
518.419***
-172.798***
(23.234)
(42.017)
(47.919)
Away from home dinner
-21.039
-104.368***
480.024***
(20.762)
(34.133)
(52.209)
Weekend
58.258***
1.756
13.027
(16.393)
(27.494)
(31.901)
Day fixed effect
-45.020***
-5.373
-1.828
(14.630)
(20.545)
(26.849)
Constant
356.094***
445.392***
793.349***
(12.293)
(16.411)
(23.475)
Observations
3,614
3,614
3,614
R-squared
0.157
0.219
0.139
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

324.752***
(34.575)
-31.182*
(18.117)
-6.409
(16.043)
35.146***
(11.425)
-32.897***
(9.465)
286.656***
(7.416)
3,924
0.122

-71.717
(49.264)
361.720***
(25.086)
-43.231*
(22.724)
-25.600*
(14.516)
-24.515*
(12.606)
356.012***
(10.650)
3,924
0.195

-75.208
(54.615)
-106.208***
(31.551)
301.318***
(29.890)
0.073
(17.504)
-12.588
(15.636)
543.349***
(12.867)
3,924
0.113

Table 2.4: The results of compensating for Food-Away-From-Home calories during other meals among healthy weight and obese
consumers
Obese (BMI ≥ 30 (kg/m2))
Healthy weight (BMI < 25 (kg/m2))
Variables
Energy (kcal)
Energy (kcal)
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Away from home breakfast
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386.837***
-149.284***
-77.221
(39.784)
(48.079)
(64.556)
Away from home lunch
-68.429***
450.347***
-149.315***
(25.801)
(39.294)
(46.050)
Away from home dinner
-12.435
-113.237***
343.017***
(23.242)
(34.824)
(51.944)
Weekend
44.403***
-12.818
30.256
(15.813)
(24.873)
(28.519)
Day fixed effect
-18.809
-10.218
-24.096
(13.510)
(17.849)
(27.104)
Constant
321.657***
397.238***
693.696***
(11.438)
(13.998)
(21.133)
Observations
2,892
2,892
2,892
R-squared
0.175
0.241
0.097
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

393.443***
(63.426)
-15.412
(31.221)
-27.051
(25.430)
34.410*
(18.725)
-67.227***
(16.195)
333.004***
(13.137)
2,196
0.136

-121.823
(79.815)
448.071***
(40.692)
-19.031
(36.790)
-14.241
(25.321)
-18.056
(21.287)
375.623***
(17.686)
2,196
0.198

29.899
(67.342)
-101.626**
(42.500)
300.799***
(43.643)
-8.708
(27.085)
12.917
(23.294)
618.709***
(18.793)
2,196
0.090

Table 2.5: The results of compensating for Food-Away-From-Home calories during other meals among high and low frequent FoodAway-From-Home consumers
< 3 away from home meal/week
> 3 away from home meal/week
Variables
Energy (kcal)
Energy (kcal)
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Away from home breakfast
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362.327***
-37.400
-86.301
(44.927)
(57.088)
(78.380)
Away from home lunch
-17.132
395.040***
-124.365***
(19.302)
(36.920)
(45.693)
Away from home dinner
-4.297
-70.679***
354.999***
(17.232)
(26.940)
(42.469)
Weekend
45.125***
-26.949
11.052
(13.407)
(21.004)
(23.742)
Day fixed effect
-51.154***
-24.546
10.771
(11.023)
(16.216)
(20.400)
Constant
318.956***
399.804***
632.601***
(7.444)
(10.458)
(15.304)
Observations
3,704
3,704
3,704
R-squared
0.111
0.139
0.102
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

390.362***
(34.193)
-58.697**
(23.567)
-22.346
(21.024)
57.242***
(16.989)
-34.081**
(15.580)
326.488***
(14.698)
2,758
0.176

-190.968***
(53.962)
479.421***
(38.750)
-74.497**
(35.243)
-4.514
(25.824)
-1.734
(20.315)
400.898***
(19.382)
2,758
0.261

-48.788
(65.677)
-157.509***
(43.485)
419.505***
(50.845)
-15.058
(30.716)
-13.779
(26.498)
690.904***
(25.062)
2,758
0.142

Table 2.6: The results of compensating for Food-Away-From-Home fat during other
meals
Fat (gm)
Variables
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
(1)
(2)
(3)
Away from home breakfast

19.799***
-5.781***
(1.619)
(1.932)
Away from home lunch
-1.207
17.046***
(0.758)
(1.146)
Away from home dinner
-0.092
-4.436***
(0.689)
(1.047)
Weekend
2.610***
0.424
(0.476)
(0.782)
Day fixed effect
-0.920**
-0.033
(0.450)
(0.604)
Constant
10.163***
18.545***
(0.374)
(0.481)
Observations
7,538
7,538
R-squared
0.137
0.132
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-3.581
(2.216)
-8.298***
(1.407)
17.101***
(1.495)
0.598
(0.863)
0.778
(0.763)
29.128***
(0.664)
7,538
0.107

Table 2.7: The results of compensating for Food-Away-From-Home sugar during other
meals
Sugar (gm)
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
Away from home breakfast

11.604***
-6.663**
(2.306)
(2.742)
Away from home lunch
-2.264*
15.354***
(1.312)
(1.957)
Away from home dinner
0.002
-3.911**
(1.189)
(1.736)
Weekend
1.330
-0.406
(0.891)
(1.165)
Day fixed effect
-1.822***
0.229
(0.684)
(0.852)
Constant
24.387***
19.768***
(0.592)
(0.671)
Observations
7,538
7,538
R-squared
0.028
0.064
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-2.551
(2.256)
-1.304
(1.652)
11.048***
(1.676)
1.266
(1.072)
1.008
(0.842)
24.002***
(0.720)
7,538
0.031

Table 2.8: The results of compensating for Food-Away-From-Home carbohydrates
during other meals
Carbohydrate (gm)
Variables
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
(1)
(2)
(3)
Away from home breakfast

32.877***
-17.609***
(3.707)
(5.125)
Away from home lunch
-6.138***
40.195***
(2.202)
(3.278)
Away from home dinner
-2.089
-8.951***
(1.946)
(2.914)
Weekend
3.041**
-0.645
(1.410)
(1.950)
Day fixed effect
-6.144***
0.410
(1.218)
(1.511)
Constant
51.795***
52.687***
(1.020)
(1.211)
Observations
7,538
7,538
R-squared
0.070
0.123
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-7.814
(4.987)
-8.396***
(2.990)
32.927***
(3.335)
2.578
(2.070)
2.837*
(1.693)
72.528***
(1.422)
7,538
0.069

Table 2.9: The results of compensating for Food-Away-From-Home sodium during other
meals
Sodium (mg)
Variables
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
(1)
(2)
(3)
Away from home breakfast

771.141***
-332.376***
(59.823)
(85.649)
Away from home lunch
-57.037**
718.608***
(25.219)
(53.673)
Away from home dinner
-25.150
-168.435***
(22.516)
(47.438)
Weekend
101.663***
4.015
(18.319)
(35.085)
Day fixed effect
-46.985***
-18.393
(15.674)
(28.164)
Constant
425.075***
1,000.999***
(12.575)
(22.289)
Observations
7,538
7,538
R-squared
0.152
0.111
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-70.085
(103.480)
-295.434***
(63.108)
550.753***
(64.494)
30.597
(39.228)
47.433
(34.243)
1,506.076***
(28.463)
7,538
0.060

Table 2.10: The results of the placebo test

Variables

Breakfast
(1)

Plain water (gm)

Energy (kcal)
Lunch
(2)

-0.003
0.016
(0.009)
(0.016)
Away from home breakfast
No
Yes
Away from home lunch
Yes
No
Away from home dinner
Yes
Yes
Controls
Yes
Yes
Observations
7,538
7,538
R-squared
0.025
0.022
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Dinner
(3)
-0.030
(0.022)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
7,538
0.014

Chapter 3:
3.1.

The Mindlessness and Mindfulness of Secondary Eating

Introduction
Since 1975, the prevalence of obesity in the U.S. has rapidly increased;

approximately two in three adults are either overweight or obese (U.S. Department of
Agricultural, 2016b). In response, researchers have investigated the factors driving excess
body weight. Secondary eating is one of those factors. Especially since the mid-1970s,
secondary eating has increased along with obesity (Zick & Stevens, 2011). Secondary
eating is defined as eating while doing something else like working or driving. Someone
who is secondarily eating might not be able to monitor the quantity (Wansink, 2007).
Bellisle and Dalix (2001) show that secondary eating, unlike primary eating, leads to
overeating.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of secondary eating on
obesity. Becker’s household production theory explains consumers’ choices regarding
time allocation (Becker, 1965), and health production (Chen, Shogren, Orazem, &
Crocker, 2002; Grossman, 1972, 2003; Huffman, 2011; Kalenkoski & Hamrick, 2013).
Based on the household production theory, health production and time allocated to eating
are affected by economic factors. A high wage increases the opportunity cost of time,
suggesting that those consumers engage in secondary eating to save time (Hamermesh,
2010). In addition, a high wage increases the expected value of future income (J. Binkley,
2010) suggesting that consumers maintain a healthier lifestyle to preserve their incomeearning capacity.
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The literature discusses secondary eating time from several angles. Some studies
investigate the effect of economic factors on secondary eating time (Senia, Jensen, &
Zhylyevskyy, 2014). Other studies investigate the effect of secondary eating time on
body weight (Bertrand & Schanzenbach, 2009; Hamermesh, 2010; Kolodinsky &
Goldstein, 2011; Zick, Stevens, & Bryant, 2011). Studies that investigate the effect of
secondary eating on obesity are inconclusive. Some studies find a negative effect of
secondary eating on body weight (Hamermesh, 2010; Zick et al., 2011), whereas other
studies find a positive effect (Bertrand & Schanzenbach, 2009). Except for Bertrand and
Schanzenbach (2009), previous studies assume that secondary eating similarly affects all
consumers, leading to overeating and obesity. This paper relaxes the assumption that
secondary eating similarly affects consumers, identifying situations when secondary
eating has a positive relationship with body weight, which we call “mindless,” and
situations when secondary eating has an inverse relationship with body weight, or
“mindful.” We hypothesize that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on
body weight. Inactive consumers are more likely to engage in mindless secondary eating
than those who are physically active.
We use data from the 2006-08 American Time Use Survey (ATUS). A
subsample of consumers who participated in the Current Population Survey (CPS) was
randomly selected to provide diaries of all activities starting from 4:00 am the day before
the interview. The Eating and Heath Module contains information on secondary eating.
There are two avenues in which lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on
obesity. First, the analysis controls for sedentary leisure activities and physical activities.
For example, watching TV for four hours increases the odds of mindless secondary eating
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more than watching TV for half an hour does. Second, the analysis controls for the type
of the primary task. The intuition is that the effect of eating while driving might differ
from eating while watching TV.
The results provide evidence that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary
eating on obesity. Maintaining a sedentary lifestyle increases the odds of mindless
secondary eating, and therefore contributes to the obesity epidemic. Consumers who eat
while doing stationary activities are susceptible to mindless secondary eating as opposed
to those who eat while doing less stationary activities. Our findings resolve the issue of
the mixed results of previous studies that focus on the effect of secondary eating on
obesity. Moreover, our results inform policies to better target people who have a
sedentary lifestyle, to help them develop a healthier one.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the data
used for the analysis and the model. Section 3.3 provides the results, and Section 3.4
concludes.
3.2.

Data and Model
We use data from the 2006-8 American Time Use Survey (ATUS). A proportion

of participants in the Current Population Survey (CPS) aged 15 years or older was
selected to provide diaries of all activities for 24 hours, starting at 4:00 am the day before
the interview. The Eating and Health Module provides information on secondary eating
and drinking and on weight and height. After reporting all activities, participants were
asked if they ate while doing other activities. The same questions were asked about
secondary drinking. Consumers were asked about drinking beverages other than plain
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water while doing something else. Obesity is measured by Body Mass Index (BMI)
which is weight in kilograms divided by the square of height in meters (kg/m2). BMI is
calculated from self-reported height and weight, so there might be some measurement
errors. Even though it is not uncommon to use self-reported BMI (Hamermesh, 2010;
Zick et al., 2011), there is no consensus on the validity of self-reported height and weight.
Kuczmarski, Kuczmarski, and Najjar (2001) find that self-reported BMI is valid for
younger adults. Merrill and Richardson (2009) and Cawley and Burkhauser (2006) find
self-reported BMI to be underestimated. To correct self-reported BMI, Cawley and
Burkhauser (2006) suggest using information from the National Health and Nutritional
Examination Survey (NHANES). For each observation, the NHANES provides two
values of weight and height; one is self-reported, and the other is measured.
Courtemanche, Heutel, and McAlvanah (2015) follow this correction method but find
that both the self-reported and corrected BMI provide almost the same results. Thus, we
consider the issue of self-reported BMI as trivial.
A BMI under 18.5 is classified as underweight, between 18.5 and 24.9 is
classified as normal weight, between 25 and 29.9 is classified as overweight, and 30 and
above is classified as obese (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015). These
classifications are for adults age 20 years and older, so we limit the sample to this age
group. Retired and unemployed individuals might differ in their time allocations, so we
omit people older than 65 years as well as those who are not working.
It should be noted that being underweight, like being overweight, has negative
impacts on health, so we omit underweight consumers. Leisure sedentary activities are
those that require more lying and sitting (Sugiyama, Healy, Dunstan, Salmon, & Owen,
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2008), including watching TV, reading, computer use, video and board games, and
sedentary commute (Dunton, Berrigan, Ballard-Barbash, Graubard, & Atienza, 2009). 12
Physical activities include all activities under the category of “sports, exercise, and
recreation” coded in the Lexicon of the ATUS as 1301xx, in addition to active commute,
walking and biking (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016). To ensure health generation, we
consider only sports with a Metabolic Equivalent Rate (MET) of 3 and above (Dunton et
al., 2009). The MET measures the intensity of activities. One MET is defined as the
energy to sit or lay (Tudor-Locke, Washington, Ainsworth, & Troiano, 2009). To do any
sport with MET of 3 and above, a person has to spend at least three times more energy
than that required for sedentary activities. We define secondary eating as the total sum of
secondary eating and secondary drinking that occurred while doing other activities. The
total time of secondary eating and drinking was also calculated using the procedure
suggested by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2016).
We use dummy variables to control for male, black, Hispanic, and other race
individuals. The omitted groups are white and female individuals. We control for age and
being married/cohabitating. We also control for education: high school, some college, or
a college degree and beyond. The omitted groups are single and the education entailment
of less than high school. We add a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if family
income is greater than 185% of the poverty income level and 0 otherwise. We add
another dummy variable to control for households with missing income. Since time
allocations and eating habits differ on weekends, in different seasons, and on holidays,

12

Due to low variation, we omit other leisure activities: tobacco and drug use; television (religious);
listening to the radio; listening to playing music (not radio); arts and crafts; hobbies, except arts and crafts
and collecting; writing for personal interest and not other specified activities.
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we add dummy variables to control for whether the interview day was during weekend
day, summer, or holiday. Finally, we control for the number of children ages 0-5 years
old and 6-17 years old.
The total number of observations is equal to 19,328. Table 3.1 presents the
weighted summary statistics of the consumers’ characteristics. The average BMI is equal
to 28 (kg/m2), which highlights the high prevalence of obesity. The average age of the
sample is 41 years old. The sample consists of 56% male, 11% black, 13% Hispanic, 6%
from other races, and 65% married individuals. Seventy-eight percent are from highincome households. The percentages of individuals with a high school degree, some
college, or a college degree or above is equal to 29, 29, and 34%, respectively. The
average number of children between 0-5 years old is 0.27 child, and the average number
of children between 6-17 years old is 0.57 child. The average percentage residing in the
Northeast, Midwest, and West regions is 18, 25 and 22%, respectively. Also, on average,
83% of individuals reside in metropolitan areas.
We hypothesize that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on obesity.
Secondary eating does not have a direct effect on obesity. An active person is less
inclined to engage in mindless secondary eating, whereas an inactive person is more
inclined to do so. We use the time that someone spends on leisure sedentary activities,
physical activities, paid work, and sedentary commute to control for lifestyle. Leisure
sedentary activities include watching TV, reading, playing games, using a computer, and
socializing with others. These activities are considered to be more habitual than others
(Neal, Wood, & Quinn, 2006). Ignoring other activities might bias our results. Other
activities might not be as habitual, but they vary in the level of sedentariness and the odds
45

of secondary eating, such as attending a football game. Thus, in other specifications, we
include all activities to reduce any possibility of omitted variable bias.
The ATUS provides information about 438 primary activities (Tudor-Locke et al.,
2009). There are 19 major categories. Each category contains several subcategories. For
example, the major category of the “household activities” encompasses 10 subcategories
such as “housework.” Examples of activities under “housework” are interior cleaning and
doing laundry. Tudor-Locke et al. (2009) develop a compendium of activities, which
maps each activity in the ATUS to a value of a MET (Washington, 2016).
To control for all time allocations, we use this compendium by dividing all
activities into three groups. The first group consists of activities with (1.5 ≥ MET). The
second group consists of activities with (1.5 < MET < 3). Activities with (MET ≥ 3) are
contained in the third group. The rationale for choosing these thresholds is that activities
with (1.5 ≥ MET), such as attending performing arts, playing video or board games,
watching TV, and listening to music, are light. Light activities increase the odds of
mindless eating. Activities with (1.5 < MET < 3) are less sedentary than the activities of
the first group but still require more movement, such as driving an automobile. Activities
with (MET ≥ 3) generate health; these include activities like interior or exterior cleaning,
playing with children (not sports), and sports in general. It is implausible to expect
engagement in secondary eating while doing the activities of the latter group increases
body weight.
To account for primary tasks, we break down secondary eating time into eating
while doing the primary activities. The implication is that the effect of secondary eating
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on body weight will depend on the main activity. For example, eating while watching TV
might increase the odds of mindless secondary eating more than eating while working or
driving. We control for all primary activities estimating the effect of secondary eating
time while doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) and activities with (1.5 < MET < 3). We
expect secondary eating while doing activities of the first group to have a positive and
relatively high effect on BMI, whereas activities of the second group to have a positive
and relatively low effect on BMI.
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics of time allocations. Panel A reports the
summary statistics for lifestyle regarding time allocations. On average, people spend 620
minutes doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) and 560 minutes doing activities with (1.5 <
MET < 3). More specifically, people allocate 12 minutes to socializing, 126 minutes to
watching TV, 7 minutes to playing video or board games or to using a computer, and 14
minutes to reading. On average, people also allocate 323 minutes to work at their main
jobs, 76 minutes to sedentary commute, and 16 minutes to physical activity. On average,
consumers spend 80 minutes per day eating while doing other activities as shown in
Panel B. The average secondary eating time is equal to 27 minutes while doing activities
with (1.5 ≥ MET). Eating while doing activities with (1.5 < MET < 3) averages to 50
minutes. The average time spent on secondary eating while doing activities of the latter
group is higher, which highlights the importance of relaxing the assumption that
secondary eating similarly influences body weight. If on average, people eat while doing
activities that require movement, then it is implausible to assume that secondary eating
has a direct effect on obesity.
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For primary identification, we compare time allocations based on obesity status.
Figure 3.1 presents the BMI kernel density distributions based on secondary eating. The
dotted line plots the BMI distribution for those who report that they were engaging in
secondary eating, and the solid line plots the BMI distribution of those who did not. No
variations in secondary eating time explain variations in BMI. Figure 3.2 provides an
example of the effect of lifestyle on obesity. Depending on watching TV, we plot the
BMI distributions. The median amount of time spent watching TV time is 100 minutes.
We categorize individuals who spend more than the median amount of time into the
watch-more-TV group (dotted line), and those who spent less than the median time into
the watch-less-TV group (solid line). Unlike the BMI distributions based on secondary
eating, Figure 3.2 indicates that variations in time spent watching TV explain variations
in obesity. Those who watch more TV are less likely to be at a healthy weight and more
likely to be at an unhealthy weight. Table 3.3 presents the secondary eating mean
differences between individuals who are obese and those who are at normal weight. On
average, there are no statistically significant differences in secondary eating time by body
weight. We compare the means of lifestyle regarding time allocations for obese and
normal weight individuals as appearing in Table 3.4. On average, obese individuals are
more likely than healthy weight individuals to maintain a sedentary lifestyle. For
example, obese individuals spend an average of 30 more minutes watching TV every day.
Overall, Figure 3.3 summarizes the information provided in Figures 3.1-2 and Tables 3.34, which we use for the primary identification. There is no direct effect on secondary
eating on obesity. The effect is indirect, moderated by lifestyle. A sedentary lifestyle
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increases the odds of mindless secondary eating, and the opposite applies for an active
way of life.
We apply OLS to test how lifestyle explains the effect of secondary eating on
BMI. Our dependent variable is BMI, and our main independent variable is secondary
eating time.

𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆 + 𝑋𝑋 ′ 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖,

(3.1)

where 𝑆𝑆 denotes secondary eating time, 𝑋𝑋 denotes a vector of controls, and 𝜖𝜖 denotes the
error term. 𝛽𝛽0, 𝛽𝛽1, and 𝛿𝛿 are the coefficients to be estimated. Equation 3.1 ignores the

aspects of lifestyle. Then, we test the null hypothesis that secondary eating does not affect
BMI. Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that secondary eating has an adverse relation
with BMI. We expand equation 3.1 to control for aspects of lifestyle.

𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆 + 𝑍𝑍 ′ 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖,

(3.2)

where Z denotes a vector of controls and includes aspects of lifestyle. These aspects are
time spent on socializing, watching TV, playing games, using a computer, reading,
working, sedentarily commuting, and being physically active. To determine the effect of
lifestyle, we test the null hypothesis of no effect of secondary eating on BMI. Failing to
reject the null hypothesis supports our hypothesis that lifestyle explains the effect of
secondary eating on body weight. For robustness checking, we jointly test whether these
aspects of lifestyle are different from zero. We perform several tests to confront various
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combinations of lifestyle elements. For example, we test whether socializing and
watching TV are jointly different from zero. We also test whether socializing, watching
TV, playing games, using a computer, and reading are different from zero. If the model in
Figure 3.3 is correct, we reject the null hypotheses that the combinations of lifestyle
aspects are jointly equal to zero. In another specification, we extend equation 3.1 by
adding two variables to control for all aspects of lifestyle. The first added variable is the
sum of the time that someone spends doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) and the second is
the sum of the time that someone spends doing activities with (1.5 < MET < 3). The
omitted group consists of activities with (MET ≥ 3) since all three groups sum up to 24
hours. Failure to reject the null hypothesis that secondary eating has no effect on body
weight further demonstrate the robustnesses of our results.
We also control for primary activities; estimating the effect of secondary eating
while doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) and activities with (1.5 < MET < 3). Finally, we
estimate how lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on obesity among males
and females to account for gender differences. A large proportion of secondary eating
time takes place while working. Different job environments might affect secondary
eating. For instance, having a desk job might increase secondary eating time, whereas
working on a farm or doing construction might not. To account for these differences, we
divide individuals into three groups based on their occupations: white collar, blue collar,
and service occupations (Courtemanche et al., 2015). 13

13

White collar occupations: Management occupations; business and financial operations occupations;
computer and mathematical science occupations; architecture and engineering occupations; life, physical,
and social science occupations; legal occupations; education, training, and library occupations; healthcare
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3.3.

Results
For all specifications, observations are weighted using the Eating and Health

Module sample weights. Table 3.5 presents the OLS estimates of equation 3.1, estimating
the effect of secondary eating time on BMI. Columns 1-4 present different specifications.
In the first specification, we control for demographic factors. In the second specification,
we add socioeconomic factors. In column 3 we control for geographic factors. We control
for year fixed effect, and whether the interview was on the weekend, in summer, or on a
holiday. Holding other variables constant, secondary eating has a positive effect on BMI.
Although the significance level is marginal, the results hold among different
specifications.
To test how the ways in which lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating
on obesity, we estimate equation 3.2, which controls for different aspects of lifestyle,
including socializing, watching TV, playing games, using a computer, reading, working,
sedentarily commuting, and being physically active. Table 3.6 presents the OLS estimates
using equation 3.2. Once we control for aspects of lifestyles, secondary eating becomes
statistically insignificant. This supports our hypothesis that lifestyle moderates the effect
of secondary eating on obesity. As reported in Table 3.6, the time that someone spends
watching TV, playing games, using a computer, working, and sedentarily commuting is
positively associated with BMI. In contrast, the time that someone spends on physical

practitioner and technical occupations; healthcare support occupations; and office and administrative
support occupations. Blue collar occupations: Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations;
farming, fishing, and forestry occupations; construction and extraction occupations; installation,
maintenance, and repair occupations; production occupations; and transportation and material moving
occupations. Service occupations: Community and social service occupations; protective service
occupations; food preparation and serving related occupations; building and grounds cleaning and
maintenance occupations; personal care and service occupations; and sales and related occupations.
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activities is negatively associated with BMI. To test the relevance of these lifestyle
aspects, we perform joint hypothesis tests. Table 3.7 shows the F-values of these tests.
The large magnitude of F-values supports the relevance of lifestyle elements. For
example, we test the null hypothesis that socializing, watching TV, playing games, using
a computer, and reading are jointly equal to zero. The F-value is equal to 13.06 and
statistically significant at 1%, so we reject the null hypothesis. We run the same
regression to demonstrate how lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating for
demographic subgroups as reported in Table 3.8. Columns 1-2 show the results for males
and females, and columns 3-5 show the results for white collar, blue collar, and service
occupations. Among men and women, controlling for lifestyle aspects explains the
effects of secondary eating on BMI. For blue collar and service occupations, controlling
for lifestyle aspects also explains the effect of secondary eating. In among white collar
individuals, secondary eating has a positive and significant effect on BMI even with
controlling for lifestyle aspects. The white collar occupations are sedentary with a higher
opportunity cost of time.
According to the household production theory, a high opportunity cost of time
encourages secondary eating to save time (Hamermesh, 2010) and encourages physical
activity to maintain earning capacity (J. Binkley, 2010). The results are consistent with
the household production theory. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of
physical activities is six times higher in magnitude, which is more than enough to offset
the effect of secondary eating.
To test if these results are affected by omitted variable bias, we control for all
activities by adding two variables of the total sum of time doing activities with (1.5 ≥
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MET) and (1.5 < MET < 3), as appearing in Table 3.9. Except for the female group, the
results in Table 3.9 are consistent with the previous findings. The results in Table 3.9
have the expected patterns. For all groups, the effects of activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) are
higher in magnitude than those of activities with (1.5 < MET < 3) since the latter are less
sedentary.
To control for all primary activities, we divide secondary eating time into eating
while doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) and doing activities with (1.5 < MET < 3). The
results show that eating while doing activities of the first group increases the odds of
mindless secondary eating (Table 3.10). The opposite is true for doing activities of the
latter group, which are less sedentary and require some movement.
Overall, secondary eating has no direct effect on obesity. We hypothesize that
lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on obesity. The results support this
hypothesis and state two avenues in which lifestyle modulates the effect of secondary
eating. The first avenue is through stationary activities. People who spend more time
socializing, watching TV, reading, using a computer, playing video or board games,
working in sedentary jobs, and sedentarily commuting are more likely to engage in
mindless secondary eating. The second avenue is the type of primary activities in which
secondary eating occurs. The analysis distinguishes between highly-and-less sedentary
activities. Those who engage in secondary eating while doing activities of the former type
are more susceptible to mindless secondary eating. In contrast, consumers who eat while
doing activities of the latter type are less vulnerable.
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3.4.

Conclusion
Since the mid-1970s, obesity has rapidly increased in the U.S.; approximately

two in three adults are either overweight or obese. Secondary eating is one factor that has
been blamed for obesity. Secondary eating is defined as eating while doing something
else such as reading or watching TV. While engaging in secondary eating, consumers
might not be able to monitor the amount of food eaten, leading to overeating and obesity.
Previous studies have assumed that secondary eating affects body weight similarly and
shown mixed results of the effect of secondary eating. Our contribution was to relax this
assumption, identifying situations in which “mindless secondary eating” positively
affects body weight and situations where “mindful secondary eating” negatively affects
body weight.
We hypothesize that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on obesity.
Using data from the 2006-8 American Time Use Survey (ATUS), the results show that
spending more time doing sedentary activities increases the odds of mindless secondary
eating, leading to overeating and obesity. Furthermore, the analysis also demonstrates
that eating while doing highly sedentary activities increases the chances for mindless
secondary eating, but eating while doing less sedentary activities discourages it.
Our findings resolve the issue of the mixed results of previous studies, which
consider secondary eating mindless (not mindful) leading to overeating and obesity.
When we control for lifestyle, secondary eating time becomes statistically insignificant.
Thus, policies that aim at reducing obesity should consider lifestyle as the real issue (not
secondary eating), targeting individuals with sedentary lifestyles to help them develop an
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active way of life. For example, improving sidewalks and running tracks might encourage
people to be more active and discourage mindless secondary eating.
Although we control for all activities in the ATUS, there might be an endogeneity
issue: A sedentary lifestyle increases the odds of mindless secondary eating and obesity,
but obesity also increases the chances of sedentary activities and secondary eating. Future
research should consider using different data, which are less challenging to obtain valid
Instrumental Variables or similar strategies to identify a causal relationship. We also did
not directly measure mindless secondary eating, where people do not pay attention to the
quantity, and mindful secondary eating, when they do so. To measure mindless and
mindful secondary eating would require information of food environment. The ATUS is
only a time use data that does not have information on food environment. 14Accordingly,
we focus on aspects of lifestyle. Future researchers should directly measure mindless and
mindful secondary eating. To illustrate, suppose two people have desk jobs and enjoy
snacking on potato chips while working. One person brings a small bag of potato chips
every day, but the other keeps a family size bag in the office. If both rely on external cues
to feel satiated (Wansink, 2007), secondary eating is supposed to be mindless when food
is plenty and mindful when food is limited.

14

Bellisle and Dalix (2001) and Bertrand and Schanzenbach (2009) use data that have information on time
use and food intake, but their data focus on females and are not nationally representative.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of consumers’ characteristics
Variables
Mean
S.D.
2
Body Mass Index (kg/m )
27.51
5.44
Age (year)
40.82
11.93
Male
0.56
0.5
Black
0.11
0.31
Other race
0.06
0.23
Hispanic
0.13
0.34
Married
0.65
0.48
Income > 185% of Income Poverty Level
0.78
0.41
Missing income
0.13
0.33
High school
0.29
0.45
Some college
0.29
0.45
College degree and beyond
0.34
0.47
Number of children age 0-5 years
0.27
0.62
Number of children age 6-17 years
0.57
0.93
Northeast
0.18
0.38
Midwest
0.25
0.43
West
0.22
0.42
Metropolitan area
0.83
0.38
Weekend
0.42
0.49
Summer
0.24
0.43
Holiday
0.02
0.13
White caller occupations
0.50
0.50
Blue caller occupations
0.25
0.44
Service occupations
0.25
0.43
Observations are weighted using the Eating and Health Module sample weights.
N = 19,328
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of lifestyle and secondary eating
Variables
Mean S.D.
(Time allocations are in 10 minutes’ intervals)
Panel A
Activities with (1.5 ≥ MET)
62.85 31.37
Activities with (1.5 < MET < 3)
55.51 25.74
Socializing
1.15
4.11
Watching TV
12.62 13.13
Video/board games
0.74
3.9
Computer use
0.67
3.21
Reading
1.4
4.15
Work
32.73 25.42
Sedentary commute
7.57
6.85
Physical activities
1.63
5.03
Panel B
Secondary eating
7.92 18.39
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET)
2.65
8.42
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 < MET < 3)
5.4
14.64
Observations are weighted using the Eating and Health Module sample weights.
N = 19,328
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Figure 3.1: The BMI Kernel density functions based on secondary eating

0

.02

Density
.04
.06

.08

Kernel density estimate

20

30

40
BMI

50

Secondary eating Yes

60

Secondary eating No

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.6822

58

Figure 3.2: The BMI Kernel density functions based on watching TV
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Table 3.3: Secondary eating mean differences between obese and normal weight individuals
Variables
(Time allocations are in 10 minutes’ intervals)
Secondary eating
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET)
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 < MET < 3)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: N = 5,255
b: N = 6,772

Obese
BMI ≥ 30a
Mean
8.34
3.29
5.34

Normal weight
BMI < 25b
Mean
8.32
2.87
5.39

Mean difference

0.02
0.42**
-0.05

60

Table 3.4: Summary statistics of lifestyle based on obesity status
Variables
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(Time allocations are in 10 minutes’ intervals)
Activities with (1.5 ≥ MET)
Activities with (1.5 < MET < 3)
Socializing
Watching TV
Video/board games
Computer use
Reading
Work
Sedentary commute
Physical activities
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: N = 5,255
b: N = 6,772

Obese
BMI ≥ 30a
Mean
66.92
51
1.30
15.02
0.90
0.74
1.39
26.43
7.35
1.22

Normal weight
BMI <25b
Mean
64.22
52.64
1.03
11.67
0.60
0.69
1.74
24.74
7.42
1.90

Mean difference
2.70***
-1.64***
0.27***
3.35***
0.30***
0.05
-0.35***
1.69***
-0.06
-0.68***

Figure 3.3: Model

Lifestyle

Secondary
eating

Obesity
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Table 3.5: The effect of secondary eating on BMI
Variables
(1)
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index
(BMI)
Secondary eating
0.006*
(0.003)
Age
0.050***
(0.005)
Male
1.204***
(0.107)
Black
1.871***
(0.168)
Hispanic
1.052***
(0.159)
Other race
0.854***
(0.230)
Married
Income > 185% of Income poverty level

Income missing
High school
Some college
College degree and beyond

Number of children age 0-5 years
Number of children age 6-17 years
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(2)

(3)

(4)

0.006**
(0.003)
0.055***
(0.005)
1.182***
(0.106)
1.634***
(0.172)
0.664***
(0.170)
0.721***
(0.225)
0.123
(0.125)
0.454***
(0.145)
-0.258
(0.175)
0.436*
(0.230)
0.266
(0.233)
1.070***
(0.228)
0.149*
(0.086)
0.123**
(0.054)

0.006*
(0.003)
0.055***
(0.005)
1.195***
(0.106)
1.592***
(0.174)
0.763***
(0.173)
0.620***
(0.228)
0.088
(0.125)
0.419***
(0.145)
-0.257
(0.175)
0.426*
(0.229)
0.289
(0.232)
1.006***
(0.228)
0.154*
(0.086)
0.128**
(0.054)

0.005*
(0.003)
0.055***
(0.005)
1.194***
(0.106)
1.591***
(0.174)
0.764***
(0.173)
0.620***
(0.228)
0.090
(0.125)
0.417***
(0.145)
-0.252
(0.175)
0.424*
(0.230)
0.287
(0.233)
1.005***
(0.229)
0.153*
(0.086)
0.130**
(0.054)

Table 3.5: Continued
Variables
Dependent variable is Body Mass
Index (BMI)
Northeast

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.469*** -0.470***
(0.152)
(0.152)
Midwest
-0.092
-0.094
(0.137)
(0.137)
West
-0.442*** -0.441***
(0.144)
(0.144)
Metropolitan area
-0.336** -0.336**
(0.144)
(0.143)
Weekend
0.016
(0.101)
Summer
0.112
(0.120)
Holiday
0.368
(0.487)
The year of 2007
0.121
(0.127)
The year of 2008
0.056
(0.125)
Constant
24.467*** 24.695*** 25.110*** 25.012***
(0.226)
(0.337)
(0.353)
(0.364)
Observations
19,328
19,328
19,328
19,328
R-squared
0.037
0.055
0.057
0.058
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: The effect of secondary eating on BMI: Adjusting for aspects of lifestyle
All
(1)
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index (BMI)
Secondary eating
0.004
(0.003)
Socializing
0.014
(0.010)
Watching TV
0.034***
(0.005)
Playing games
0.058***
(0.017)
Computer use
0.034*
(0.020)
Reading
0.015
(0.020)
Work
0.011***
(0.003)
Sedentary commute
0.022***
(0.008)
Physical activities
-0.035***
(0.009)
Age
0.054***
(0.005)
Male
1.032***
(0.108)
Black
1.501***
(0.175)
Hispanic
0.781***
(0.172)
Other race
-0.608***
(0.228)
Married
0.101
(0.124)
Income > 185% of Income poverty level
-0.394***
(0.145)
Income missing
-0.267
(0.173)
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Table 3.6. Continued
All
(1)
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index (BMI)
High school
Some college
College degree and beyond
Number of children age 0-5 years
Number of children age 6-17 years
Northeast
Midwest
West
Metropolitan area
Weekend
Summer
Holiday
The year of 2007
The year of 2008
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.428*
(0.229)
0.349
(0.233)
-0.873***
(0.230)
0.210**
(0.087)
0.164***
(0.054)
-0.413***
(0.152)
-0.058
(0.136)
-0.398***
(0.141)
-0.380***
(0.143)
0.081
(0.117)
0.172
(0.119)
0.581
(0.494)
0.122
(0.126)
0.046
(0.125)
24.030***
(0.386)
19,328
0.066

Table 3.7: Joint hypothesis tests
Joint hypothesis tests
F-value
(3)
(4)
(5)

Variables
(1)
(2)
(6)
(7)
Socializing
27.17
21.04
(0.000)
Watching TV
16.31
(0.000)
13.06
(0.000)
Playing games
11.38
(0.000)
(0.000) 9.77
Computer use
(0.000) 11.14
Reading
(0.000)
Work
Sedentary
commute
Physical
activities
p-value in parentheses
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Table 3.8: The effect of secondary eating on BMI: Adjusting for aspects of lifestyle
among different groups
Male
Female
White
Blue
Service
collar
collar
occupation
occupation occupation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index (BMI)
Secondary eating
Socializing
Watching TV
Playing games
Computer use
Reading
Work
Sedentary commute
Physical activities

Controls

0.001
0.006
0.010**
(0.004) (0.005)
(0.004)
0.011
0.017
0.015
(0.012) (0.017)
(0.017)
0.031*** 0.038*** 0.045***
(0.006) (0.007)
(0.007)
0.048** 0.086*** 0.101***
(0.020) (0.032)
(0.030)
0.030
0.046
0.045
(0.024) (0.035)
(0.029)
0.008
0.020
0.018
(0.039) (0.016)
(0.015)
0.010*** 0.010** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.004)
(0.004)
0.023**
0.020
0.031***
(0.010) (0.014)
(0.010)
-0.016
-0.060***
0.111***
(0.011) (0.017)
(0.013)
Yes

Yes

Yes

-0.005
(0.006)
0.010
(0.017)
0.023***
(0.008)
0.025
(0.031)
0.064
(0.045)
0.059
(0.083)
0.017***
(0.005)
-0.015
(0.015)
0.001

-0.001
(0.006)
0.013
(0.018)
0.025***
(0.009)
0.033
(0.027)
0.005
(0.022)
-0.029
(0.027)
0.004
(0.005)
0.042**
(0.019)
-0.034*

(0.017)

(0.019)

Yes

Yes

Observations
9,877
9,451
10,442
4,351
R-squared
0.042
0.092
0.081
0.041
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4,535
0.080

Table 3.9: The effect of secondary eating on BMI: Adjusting for aspects of lifestyle among different groups
White
Blue collar
All
Male
Female
collar
occupation
Variables
occupation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index (BMI)
Secondary eating
Activities with (1.5 ≥ MET)
Activities with (1.5 < MET < 3)
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Controls

Service
occupation
(6)

0.005
(0.003)
0.022***
(0.004)
0.014***
(0.003)

0.002
(0.004)
0.015***
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.004)

0.008*
(0.005)
0.039***
(0.007)
0.024***
(0.006)

0.011***
(0.004)
0.029***
(0.006)
0.018***
(0.005)

-0.005
(0.007)
0.013*
(0.006)
0.013**
(0.005)

-0.001
(0.006)
0.025***
(0.008)
0.016***
(0.006)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

9,451
0.086

10,442
0.071

4,351
0.032

4,535
0.075

Observations
19,328
9,877
R-squared
0.060
0.036
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.10: The effect of secondary eating on BMI: Adjusting for primary tasks among different groups
White
All
Male
Female
collar
Variables
occupation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index (BMI)
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 ≥
MET)
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 <
MET < 3)

Controls

Blue collar
occupation

Service
occupation

(5)

(6)

0.032**

0.023**

0.034**

0.021

0.021

(0.009)
0.002

(0.013)
-0.002

(0.012)
0.005

(0.014)
0.004

(0.018)
-0.009

(0.013)
0.001

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.008)

(0.007)

(0.010)

(0.009)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

9,451
0.086

10,442
0.071

4,351
0.032

4,535
0.075
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0.027***

Observations
19,328
9,877
R-squared
0.060
0.036
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Chapter 4: Validating the Use of Time Preference Proxies to Explain Effects on
Health Outcomes
4.1.

Introduction
Variations in time preferences help explain variations in health-related behaviors

such as smoking, caloric intake, physical activities, and obesity. Impatient individuals
discount the future more, weighing present gratification more than future well-being. The
opposite is true for patient individuals. The rate of time preference measures the ability to
delay benefits in this present-future trade-off. Many researchers elicit the rate of time
preference using questionnaires for monetary gains and losses (Fuchs, 1980; Khwaja,
Silverman, & Sloan, 2007), asking, for example, to choose between receiving $5 today
and $10 in a week. Others use proxies for the rate of time preferences (Lawless,
Drichoutis, & Nayga Jr, 2013). Huston and Finke (2003) use the level of education,
exercise, and the use of nutritional labels as proxies for time preferences to investigate
the effect of time preferences on diet choices. Smith, Bogin, and Bishai (2005) use
dissaving as a proxy to estimate the effect of time preferences on obesity. Cavaliere, De
Marchi, and Banterle (2013) use the consideration of taste vs. nutrition when food
shopping as a proxy when investigating obesity. In their investigation of obesity, Zhang
and Rashad (2008) use the lack of self-control to lose weight and Ikeda, Kang, and
Ohtake (2010) use debt and the degree of procrastinating over homework assignments
during school vacations as proxies for time preferences.
These proxies reflect intertemporal choices in which individuals make trade-offs
between the present and the future. For example, the consideration of nutrition involves
forgoing the present gratification of tasty food to improve future health. Thus, these
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studies find that impatience is associated with a negative health outcome. For instance,
Ikeda et al. (2010), find that an increase in the degree of procrastinating over homework
assignments during school vacations is associated with a 2.81% increase in the
probability of being obese.
In their investigation of the effect of time preferences on obesity, Borghans and
Golsteyn (2006) examine the use of their time preference proxies by determining
correlations between the proxies used and elicited discount rates. They conclude that the
relationship between obesity and time preferences strongly depends on the choice of
proxies. The validation of using proxies to explain the effect of time preferences on
health outcomes has not been exhaustively investigated. The objective of this paper is to
scrutinize the use and validity of such proxies for time preferences in investigations of
health outcomes. This paper’s emphasis is on the methodology rather than on policy
implications. The results will provide researchers interested in determining the effect of
time preferences on health outcomes with guidance on how to measure time preferences,
specifically those who use secondary data.
For health outcomes, we focus on obesity. The prevalence of obesity has rapidly
increased. Approximately two-thirds of the U.S. adult population are either overweight or
obese (U.S. Department of Agricultural, 2016b). In an effort to understand the factors
that contribute to obesity, researchers have shown interest in estimating the effect of time
preferences on obesity, either by eliciting or using proxies for the rate of time preference.
We utilize data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which is a
nationally representative database from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In 1979, the
NLSY79 started interviewing youths between 14-22 years old, and then continued to
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interview them annually until 1994 and biennially afterward. Before 2006, the NLSY79
provided information that can be used as proxies for time preferences. Our choice of
proxies comes from the studies of Cadena and Keys (2015); Courtemanche et al. (2015);
DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) that are most recent and use the NLSY79. The
investigated proxies are: “The interviewer remarks whether the participant was patient,”
having a bank account, declaring bankruptcy, maxing out a credit card, smoking, joining
vocational clubs in high school, life insurance, and the Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT). We term the interviewer remark the “patience” proxy. The AFQT is an IQ test
that determines military entrance and was given to the NLSY79 participants. In 2006, the
NLSY79 added two hypothetical monetary present-future trade-off questions to its
survey. The first question informs the participants about winning $1,000, then asks them
to state the additional amount they will accept to receive the prize in a month. The second
question is similar except the time horizon is a year rather than a month. The NLSY79
also contains information on body weight and height, enabling us to measure obesity.
Given these two elicitation questions as well as information to measure obesity, we
compare the elicited rates of time preference to the various proxies to validate the use of
proxies in the estimation of the effect of time preferences on obesity.
The standard economic assumption is that people discount the future at a constant
rate of time preference, which is characterized by an exponential functional form
(Samuelson, 1937). Recent evidence suggests that the rate of time preference is relatively
low in the near future and relatively high in the far future, characterized by a quasihyperbolic functional form (Laibson, 1997). Because the elicitation questions cover twotime frames, we investigate the hyperbolic discounting rate as an alternative to the
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constant exponential discount rate, in relation to the proxy measures. We use the
concentration indices (CIs). The CIs rank the population by a measure of time
preferences and calculate the overall concentration of the cumulative percentage of
obesity against the cumulative percentage of the population (Wagstaff, O'Donnell, Van
Doorslaer, & Lindelow, 2007). The CIs are superior to OLS because the CIs consider
variations in the ranking rather than variations in the time preference measure, so the
results are insensitive to outliers or different proxy scaling. The individual will have the
same ranking regardless of outliers and different scaling among our proxies, simplifying
the validation of our proxies and providing a value judgment to guide practitioners who
are interested in using proxies to estimate health outcomes.
The results support the validity of time preference proxies to explain variations in
time preference. Ranking the population by different time preference measures indicates
the obesity concentration among impatient individuals. Under hyperbolic discounting, the
proxies of patience, smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational clubs in high school
are validated. In contrast, under the exponential discounting, the proxies of patience,
maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational
clubs are also validated. Other proxies overestimate patience by 5% under hyperbolic
discounting and by 4% under exponential discounting. We also test the performance of
our proxies among demographic subgroups, including males vs. females, highly educated
vs. less educated, and white vs. nonwhite individuals to further guide practitioners who
are targeting a specific demographic group.
The rest of this essay is divided into five sections. Section 4.2 explains the
concept of time preferences and the difference between the exponential and hyperbolic
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discounting. Section 4.3 presents the data used for the analysis, demonstrating the
computation of the rates of time preferences and providing more details for our proxies.
Section 4.4 explains the model regarding the use of the CIs to validate time preference
proxies. Section 4.5 reports the results, and section 4.6 concludes the discussion.
4.2.

Time Preference
The intertemporal choices reflect a trade-off between present gratifications and

future well-being. Impulsive behaviors involve a cost of forgoing the present gratification
now and receiving the benefit later. For example, dieting involves a cost of forgoing the
present gratification of tasty food to generate better health in the future. The rate of time
preference measures the ability to delay benefits. In technical terms, let U be the utility.
For a finite time 𝑇𝑇, the discounted utility model is equal to,
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛿𝛿 2 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+2 + ⋯

; 𝑡𝑡 = 0,1,2, … 𝑇𝑇.

(4.1)

The standard economic assumption is that the economic agent is rational,
discounting the future at a constant rate of time preference, and the exponential functional
form characterizes the rate of time preference (Samuelson, 1937),

1 𝑡𝑡
𝛿𝛿 = �
�,
1 + 𝜌𝜌
𝑡𝑡

where 𝛿𝛿 is the discount factor, 𝜌𝜌 is the discount rate, and 𝛿𝛿 0 =1.
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Other studies indicate a conflict between the rate of time preference today and in
the future (Laibson, 1997; R. Thaler, 1981). An example from (R. Thaler, 1981) explains
such conflict (time inconsistency). Suppose an individual faces two sets of choices, (A)
and (B) as follows:
(A)

(B)

Choose between:

Choose between:

(A.1)

One apple today.

(A.2)

Two apples tomorrow.

(B.1)

One apple in one year.

(B.2)

Two apples in one year plus one day.

Source: (R. Thaler, 1981)
This individual might choose (A.1) over (A.2) and (B.2) over (B.1). The consistency in
time preferences implies that in 364 days, the individual still prefers (B.2) over (B.1).
However, preferences reflect time-inconsistency if reconsidering (B.1).
Heath behaviors such as smoking, exercising, and dietary choices might reflect
time-inconsistency in discounting. For example, someone prefers exercising in a week
over exercising now. A week later, he or she procrastinates maybe to the following week
and so on, drawn on the present bias. In this situation, the exponential functional form
fails to explain individuals’ behaviors. Laibson (1997) suggests that quasi-hyperbolic
discounting resonates with the inconsistency in time preference. Hyperbolic discounting
means that the individual discounts the near future at a high rate and discounts the far
future at a low rate. Shapiro (2005) finds that food stamp program (currently called the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)) recipients experience a decline in
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caloric intake in months in which they receive benefits. Food stamp recipients
impatiently increase their caloric intake at the beginning of the month but patiently
decrease their caloric intake toward the end of the month. Richards and Hamilton (2012)
investigate the effect of time preferences on risk behaviors including obesity and find that
hyperbolic discounting provides a better fit of their data. Following Laibson (1997) the
discounted utility model is equal to,

𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿 2 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+2 + ⋯

; 𝑡𝑡 = 0,1,2, … 𝑇𝑇,

(4.2)

where 𝛽𝛽 is the present bias, 𝛽𝛽 < 1 implies time-inconsistency, and 𝛽𝛽 = 1 implies timeconsistency in which the discount factor takes the exponential functional form.

Nevertheless, The NLSY79 provides two elicitation questions over two time frames. The
first-time frame is over a month and the other is over a year. The empirical model uses
the hyperbolic discount factor and the constant exponential discount factor in relation to
the proxy measures. The following section explains the data used for the analysis,
demonstrating the elicitation procedure and the logic for our proxies.
4.3.

Data
We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which is

a nationally representative database from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In 1979,
NLSY79 interviewed 12,686 youths between 14-22 years. The same individuals were
then interviewed annually until 1994 and biennially after 1994. We omit observations
with missing information. The final sample consists of 6,094 observations.
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Before 2006, the NLSY79 provided information that could be used to proxy for
time preferences. However, in 2006, the NLSY79 added two hypothetical present-future
trade-off questions to its survey. In the first question, the time horizon is a month. In the
second question, the time horizon is a year. The hypothetical monetary questions asked in
the NLSY79 are:

“Suppose you have won a prize of $1000, which you can
claim immediately. However, you can choose to wait one
month to claim the prize. If you do wait, you will receive
more than $1000. What is the smallest amount of money in
addition to the $1000 you would have to receive one month
from now to convince you to wait rather than claim the prize
now?”
“Let me ask the same question but with a one year wait
instead of one month. Suppose you have won a prize of
$1000, which you can claim immediately. However, you
have the alternative of waiting one year to claim the prize. If
you do wait, you will receive more than $1000. What is the
smallest amount of money in addition to the $1000 you
would have to receive one year from now to convince you to
wait rather than claim the prize now?”
4.3.1. The Calculation of Discount Factors
We exploit the different time frames of the elicitation questions to compute the
constant exponential discount factor and the hyperbolic discount factor (Courtemanche et
al., 2015). Let 𝑎𝑎1 denote the answer to the first hypothetical monetary question over a

month time horizon. The annualized discount factor, 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹1, is
12
1,000
𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹1 = �
� .
1,000 + 𝑎𝑎1
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(4.3)

Let also 𝑎𝑎2 denote the answer to the second hypothetical monetary question over

a year time horizon. The annualized discount factor, 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹2 , is
1,000
𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹2 = �
�,
1,000 + 𝑎𝑎2

(4.4)

𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹1 is equal to the hyperbolic discount factor, 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 in equation 4.2, and 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹2 is equal to the
exponential discount factor, 𝛿𝛿 in equation 4.1.
4.3.2. Time Preference Proxies
Our choice of proxies comes from Cadena and Keys (2015); Courtemanche et al.
(2015); DellaVigna and Paserman (2005). These studies are most recent and use time
preference proxies from the NLSY79. 15 Cadena and Keys (2015) estimate the effect of
time preference on investments in human capital. Impatient individuals invest less in
human capital and earn 13% less over their lifetimes compared to patient individuals
(Cadena & Keys, 2015). Cadena and Keys (2015) also find that impatient individuals are
less likely to save money and more likely to smoke, excessively drink, attrit the NLSY79
that they had previously agreed to participate in, and exit the military early. DellaVigna
and Paserman (2005) use proxies to estimate the effect of time preference on job search
by the unemployed. Impatient individuals make fewer efforts searching for a job, exiting
unemployment later. Courtemanche et al. (2015) study the interactions of time
preferences and food prices and their effects on obesity. Impatient individuals are more

15

Courtemanche et al. (2015) and Cadena and Keys (2015) provide online supporting material. We use
their codes to clean the data and utilize the sample.
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responsive to low food prices, which leads to the overconsumption of food and obesity.
Courtemanche et al. (2015) find that the elicited discount factors are correlated with other
proxies that reflect intertemporal choices. For example, the elicited discount factors are
positively correlated with the AFQT and negatively correlated with maxing out a credit
card, smoking, and declaring bankruptcy (Courtemanche et al., 2015). Our analysis uses
the following proxies:
Patience: After each survey, the interviewer remarks on the general attitude of the
survey participant: whether the participant was friendly and interested, cooperative but
not particularly interested, impatient and restless, or hostile. We use the interviewer
remarks to generate a proxy for time preference that we term “patience.” The patience
proxy is equal to 1 if the individual is friendly and interested, and zero if otherwise. The
patience proxy also was implemented by DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) and Cadena
and Keys (2015). However, our interpretation of patience/impatience differs from that in
DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) and Cadena and Keys (2015). We consider
“cooperative but not interested” as impatient, whereas DellaVigna and Paserman (2005)
and Cadena and Keys (2015) consider them otherwise. The reason is that DellaVigna and
Paserman (2005) and Cadena and Keys (2015) were interested in measuring
patience/impatience using the interviewer remarks in the period of 1980-1985. At that
time, the participants were much younger (15-28 years). However, we are interested in
using the interviewer remarks in 2006 when participants are much older (41-49 years
old). Younger individuals are more inclined to express their impatience directly, but
social norms promote older individuals to be less inclined to do so. As a result, we

80

consider as impatient those whom interviewers identify as cooperative but not
particularly interested.
Bank account: A bank account organizes spending in the present and saves money
for the future. Patient consumers are more likely to possess a bank account. We use the
1985-2000 and 2004 waves to obtain information on having a bank account. For each
year, we create a dummy variable indicating the possession of a bank account and assign
participants the average dummies.
Maxing out a credit card: Impatient consumers are more likely to max out a credit
card, although doing so raises the interest paid. We use the NLSY79 2004 wave, which
asks consumers the total number of maxed out credit cards. This proxy is a dummy
variable, which equals 1 if the person had never maxed out a credit card, and zero
otherwise.
Bankruptcy: Patience lends itself to better financial management either through
controlling impulsive spending, saving, or maintaining the earning source. In contrast,
impatience lends itself to worse financial management, increasing the odds of
bankruptcy. The NLSY79 asks participants whether they ever have declared bankruptcy.
A dummy variable is added, which equals 1 if the individual had never declared
bankruptcy, and zero otherwise.
Life insurance: Patient individuals are more likely to work for employers who
provide life insurance. We use information from the NLSY79 1979-2004 waves. For each
year, we create a dummy variable that indicates obtaining employer-provided life
insurance, assigning each participant the average dummies.
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Vocational clubs in high school: Patient students are more likely to obtain higher
education and less likely to participate in a vocational club in high school. In 1984, the
NLSY79 asked participants if they engaged in vocational clubs in high school. Similar to
DellaVigna and Paserman (2005), we focus on seven vocational clubs. We create a
dummy variable for not participating in each club and then assign each individual the
average dummies. The vocational clubs are: The American Industrial Arts Association,
Distributive Education Clubs of America, Future Business Leaders of America, Future
Farmers of America, Health Occupations Student Association, Office Education
Association which is now known as the Business Professionals of America, and
Vocations Industrial Club of America (DellaVigna & Paserman, 2005).
Smoking: Given the negative health consequences smoking can cause, patience
leads to forgoing the present gratification of cigarettes for future wellbeing. In 1992,
1994, and 1998, the NLSY79 asked participants whether they have smoked at least 100
cigarettes during their lives. We add a dummy variable that indicates if the participant has
not smoked 100 cigarettes.
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT): The AFQT is an IQ test that
determines military entrance. In 1981, the NLSY79 participants took the AFQT test,
regardless of their interest in serving in the military. Those participants who are futureoriented invest in human capital and score higher on the AFQT.
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for time preference measures. The
average hyperbolic and exponential discount factor equals 0.28 and 0.59, respectively.
On average, the hyperbolic discount factor indicates a lower level of patience, whereas
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the exponential discount factor indicates a higher level. One explanation for the
difference between the discount factors is that the present bias, 𝛽𝛽, is high among

hyperbolic discounters. On average, the NLSY79 interviewers remark on 87% of
participants as patient. Seventy-five percent of the time, individuals report that they
possess a bank account. Ninety-one percent never max out a credit card and 87% have
never declared bankruptcy. Roughly 60% of individuals indicate having life insurance
that was provided by their employers. Forty-three percent of individuals have not smoked

100 cigarettes in their lives, and 97% never participated in vocational clubs in high
school. The average AFQT score equals 51%. Table 4.2 shows the pairwise correlations
between time preference measures. The correlation between the exponential discount
factor and the hyperbolic discount factor is 0.58. Both discount factors are positively
correlated with other proxies, yet they are attenuated, maybe because these proxies are
calculated from different waves of the NLSY79 (DellaVigna & Paserman, 2005).
We focus on obesity as the health outcome variable. Obesity is measured by the
Body Mass Index (BMI), which is defined as weight in kilograms divided by the square
of height in meters (kg/m2). The obesity threshold is set to 30 (kg/m2). Expressing the
BMI distribution as a dichotomous variable neglects body weight beyond the obesity
threshold (Bilger, Kruger, & Finkelstein, 2016), and so we consider body weight beyond
the obesity threshold. Let ℎ be the obesity outcome variable,
(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 − 𝑠𝑠) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝑠𝑠
ℎ=�
,
0
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
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(4.5)

where 𝑠𝑠 is the obesity threshold (hereafter, health outcomes are reverse to obesity and
vice versa).

The above proxies present patience. The patience level increases in a nondescending order. For example, the bank account proxy consists of fractional values
bounded between zero and one. A zero value means perfect impatience, and one means
perfect patience. We estimate the predicted values of all proxies as well as the elicited
discount factors controlling for age, gender, education, race, occupation, net family
income, and risk. For the patience proxy, we also control for the interview length. For
occupation, we categorize participants into white collar, blue collar, or service
occupations (Courtemanche et al., 2015). For risk, we incorporate the certainty equivalent
of a 50/50 chance gamble of winning $10,000 or nothing. Table 4.3 presents a summary
of statistics for the individuals’ characteristics. The average BMI equals 28, which
indicates the high prevalence of obesity. The proportion of individuals who fall beyond
the obesity threshold is equal to 29%. The average BMI beyond the obesity threshold
equals 1.41 (kg/m2). During the investigation, participants were middle aged, between 41
and 49 years old, with an average of 45 years old. The sample consists of 53% male, 6%
Hispanic, 13% black, 81% white, and 64% married individuals.
Regarding education attainment, the share of high school graduates is 41%, and
the share of individuals with some college is 24%. Twenty-eight percent have a college
degree or beyond. On average, individuals work 36 hours per week. Fifty-five percent
work in white-collar occupations, 23% work in blue-collar occupations, and 10% work in
service occupations. The average net household income equals 8.29 (measured in

84

$10,000). On risk attitude, the certainty equivalent of a 50/50 chance gamble of winning
$10,000 or nothing roughly averages $4,800.
Finally, the elicited discount factors as well as the proxies of bank account,
vocational clubs, and life insurance proxies, contain fractional values bounded between
zero and one. For a fractional dependent variable with extreme values at zero and one,
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) suggest the use of a Generalized Linear Model (GLM)
with a binomial family and a probit link to provide a better inference. We also estimate
the probability of the patience, bankruptcy, smoking, and maxing out credit card proxies
using probit models. The predicted values of the AFQT proxy are estimated using OLS.
4.4.

Model
To validate the use of time preference proxies in estimating health outcomes, we

employ the Concentration Indices (CIs). The CIs are widely used in poverty analysis to
measure socioeconomic-health inequality. For example, Makate and Makate (2016) use
the CIs to measure socioeconomic inequality in the utilization of maternal healthcare for
the Zimbabwean population. Arnold et al. (2016) use the CIs to calculate socioeconomic
inequalities in cancer incidence and mortality among 43 countries. Others such as
Yiengprugsawan, Lim, Carmichael, Dear, and Sleigh (2010) estimate socioeconomic
inequality in morbidity in Thailand, Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer, and Watanabe (2003)
measure socioeconomic inequality in malnutrition in Vietnam in 1993 and 1998, Bilger et
al. (2016) estimate the socioeconomic inequality in obesity for the U.S. population from
1971-2012, and Lindelow (2006) measures socioeconomic inequality in hospital visits,
health center visits, complete immunizations, pregnancy control, and institutional
delivery in Mozambique.
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The CIs investigate the overall concentration of the cumulative percentage of the
health outcome against the cumulative percentage of the population, ranked by a
specified standard. Studies that focus on socioeconomic inequality in health rank the
population by living standards. For example, they rank the population by poverty income
ratio (Bilger et al., 2016), an asset index (Makate & Makate, 2016), monthly adultequivalent household income (Yiengprugsawan et al., 2010), and an index of human
development (Arnold et al., 2016). Because our interest is validating time preference
proxies, we rank the population by a measure of time preference instead of a living
standard. We rank the population by the hyperbolic discount factor, the exponential
discount factor, and the other proxies. A statistically insignificant difference between the
CIs based on the elicited discount factors and those based on a certain proxy validates the
use of that proxy.
Another method to validate the use of time preference proxies is to use OLS, by
separately regressing the health outcome variable on the elicited discount factors and
other proxies with controlling for other observed factors. Across equations, we test the
differences between the elicited discount factor coefficients and the coefficients of other
proxies. Suppose that all time preference measures’ coefficients have the expected
patterns. Impatience is positively associated with poor health outcomes. A statistically
insignificant difference between the elicited discount factor coefficient and a certain
proxy coefficient validates the use of the proxy.
However, the CIs method is superior to OLS for two reasons. First, outliers affect
the OLS estimates. For example, consider two cases. In the first case, someone has life
insurance for 20 years, which is the highest value. In the second case, suppose the same
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person has life insurance for 6 years, and again this is the highest value. In both cases, the
OLS might yield different results. Second, different proxy scaling prevents us from
obtaining a value judgment. We assume that the elicited discount factors are the correct
time preference measures. If bias between the elicited discount factor and time preference
proxies exists, we are only able to determine its direction, but not the magnitude. As an
illustration, suppose we run an OLS, and 𝛽𝛽̂1 is the elicited discount factor coefficient.

Also, suppose we run another OLS regression of the health outcome on the life insurance
proxy, and 𝛽𝛽̂2 is the proxy coefficient. Recall that for the life insurance proxy, we create

20 dummy variables. If bias exists, then the bias equals 𝛽𝛽̂1 − 𝛽𝛽̂2 when assigning each
�

𝛽𝛽
individual the average dummies and equals 𝛽𝛽̂1 − 202 when assigning each individual the

summation of 20 dummies. Thus, different proxy scaling affects bias magnitude, 𝛽𝛽̂1 −
�

𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽̂2 ≠ 𝛽𝛽̂1 − 202.

Our contribution is methodological; we aim at providing practitioners who are
interested in using time preference proxies to estimate health outcomes the guidance to
do so. The CIs provide a value judgment, so we determine which proxy better explains
variations in time preferences and provide practitioners with suggestions on how to adjust
for bias when using imperfect proxies. Outliers and different scaling do not affect the CIs.
The CIs consider the variations in ranking, not the variations in time preference measures
(Wagstaff et al., 2007). It does not matter how we scale our proxies and whether outliers
exist in the data; an individual has the same ranking.
The CI is defined as one minus twice the area under the concentration curve (CC)
(Lindelow, 2006; Wagstaff et al., 2007; Wagstaff & Watanabe, 2003). The CC plots the
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cumulative percentage of the health outcome against the cumulative percentage of the
population, ranked by a measure of a time preference as appearing in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
The 45-degree line is called the equality line, which indicates the situation when the
health outcome is equal for all individuals regardless of their level of patience. If the CC
appears above the equality line, the health outcomes are concentrated among the
impatient as shown in Figure 4.1. In contrast, if the CC is below the equality line, the
health outcomes are concentrated among the patient as shown in Figure 4.2. The CI
measures concentration in health outcomes as,

1

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 1 − 2 � 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑝𝑝)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑,
0

(4.6)

where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 denotes the concentration index, 𝑝𝑝 is the fractional rank of the population below
a specified threshold, and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the concentration curve.

For computational ease, the concentration index is equal to the covariance
between the health outcome and the fractional rank, scaled by two and divided by the
health outcome mean,

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =

2
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(ℎ, 𝑟𝑟),
𝜇𝜇ℎ

where 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(ℎ, 𝑟𝑟) denotes the covariance between the health variable, ℎ, and the rank of

(4.7)

the time preference measure, 𝑟𝑟. We can use a convenient regression to estimate equation
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4.7 after rescaling the health outcome variable by twice the rank variance divided by the
mean of the health outcome (Erreygers, Clarke, & Zheng, 2017; Lindelow, 2006;
Wagstaff et al., 2007; Wagstaff et al., 2003).

2𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2
ℎ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖,
𝜇𝜇ℎ

(4.8)

The CI is equal to 𝛽𝛽̂ in equation 4.8. For statistical inference, we use the standard error of
𝛽𝛽̂ . The CI is equal to −1 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ≤ 1. A negative value admits the concentration of health
outcome among impatient individuals, but a positive value admits the concentration of

health outcomes among patient individuals. A zero CI means no variation in the health
outcome.
The CIs can be sensitive to the choice of the ranking measure (Lindelow, 2006;
Wagstaff et al., 2007; Wagstaff et al., 2003). Wagstaff and Watanabe (2003) study the
CI’s sensitivity to the choice of a living standard. Across 19 countries, they measure two
outcomes of child malnutrition, being underweight or stunted, ranking the population by
consumption and an asset index. For each child malnutrition outcome, at most 6 out of 19
countries show sensitivities to the choice of the living standard, concluding that both
living standards generate the same CIs. Lindelow (2006) also uses both consumption and
the asset index to measure socioeconomic inequality in four health outcomes. For all four
health outcomes, the CIs show sensitivity to the living standard choice, contrasting with
the results of Wagstaff and Watanabe (2003).
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The CIs sensitivity to the choice of a ranking measure concerns practitioners
whose focus is measuring socioeconomics inequality in health. However, we consider the
CIs sensitivity to be a real strength in validating the use of time preference proxies in the
estimation of health outcomes. Our main assumption is that the elicited discount factors
are the correct time preference measures, and so we ask the following question- does a
ranking by time preference proxy alter the CIs? To explain the situations when time
preference proxy yields the same result as the elicited discount factor, suppose 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 and 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝
are the rankings based on the elicited discount factor and time preference proxy,

respectively. Also suppose 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒 and 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝 are the two 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶s based on different rankings, then
we rewrite equation 4.7 as follows,

Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =

2
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(ℎ, Δ𝑟𝑟),
𝜇𝜇ℎ

(4.9)

where Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the difference between the two CIs, Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒 − 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝 and Δ𝑟𝑟 is the

difference between the rankings, Δ𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 − 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 . For individuals to have the same ranking
on both time preference measures, Δ𝑟𝑟=0, is a sufficient condition. The necessary

condition is that the reranking does not covary with the health outcome even if they have
different ranking points. We can use a convenient OLS regression,

2
2𝜎𝜎Δ𝑟𝑟
ℎ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 Δ𝑟𝑟 + 𝜖𝜖,
𝜇𝜇ℎ
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(4.10)

2
where 𝜎𝜎Δ𝑟𝑟
is the reranking variance. 𝛽𝛽̂1 in equation 4.10 is equal to Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. For a statistical

inference, we also use the standard error of 𝛽𝛽̂1. Finally, we use equation 4.8 to estimate
the CIs, ranking the population by the elicited hyperbolic discount factor, the elicited

exponential discount factor, and other proxies. Assuming that the elicited discount factors
are the correct time preference measures, we use equation 4.10 to determine how
reranking from the elicited discount factors to time preference proxies affect the CIs.
4.5.

Results
Table 4.4 shows the results of validating time preference proxies in the estimation

of health outcomes. Column 1 presents the estimates for obesity concentration using
equation 4.8. The negative CIs indicate the predicted patterns in which obesity
concentrates among impatient individuals. The CIs range from 0.105-0.178 in absolute
value, wherein ranking by the patience proxy demonstrates the smallest pro-impatience
obesity concentration and ranking by the bank account proxy demonstrates the largest
pro-impatience obesity concentration. Given the high prevalence of obesity in which
nearly one-third of the population are obese, a CI between 0.105-0.178 is relatively high.
Figure 4.3 plots the CCs based on ranking the population by the elicited discount
factors. The dashed line indicates ranking by the hyperbolic discount factor, and the
dotted line indicates ranking by the exponential discount factor. The solid line represents
the equality line, which indicates the situation when all people have the same body
weight. Both CCs appear above the equality line and demonstrate the obesity
concentration among impatient individuals. An example of the CCs when ranking the
population by the time preference proxies appears in Figure 4.4. The dashed line
indicates the CC based on ranking the population by the patience proxy. The CC when
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ranking by the bank account proxy appears as a dotted line. Ranking by these two proxies
demonstrates that obesity concentrates among impatient individuals. The CC of the bank
account proxy lies above the CC of the patience proxy, which determines a higher
concentration of obesity among impatient individuals.
To validate time preference proxies, we use equation 4.10 to test whether
reranking from the elicited discount factors to the other proxies affects the CIs. Column 2
of Table 4.4 presents the differences in the CIs, Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, when reranking from the hyperbolic
discount factor to other proxies. Reranking to the proxies of patience, smoking, life

insurance, or joining vocational clubs does not affect the CIs. In contrast, reranking from
the exponential discount factor to the proxies of patience, maxing out a credit card,
bankruptcy, smoking, joining vocational clubs, or life insurance does not affect the CIs
appearing in column 3. The similarity between the CIs when reranking from the elicited
discount factors to the other proxies validates the use of time preference proxies. Such
similarities do not ensure the same ranking on different time preference measures but
only suggest that reranking and obesity do not correlate. We strongly suggest employing
the proxies of patience, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, life insurance, and
vocational clubs when assuming exponential time preferences. When assuming
hyperbolic time preferences, we strongly suggest employing the proxies of patience,
smoking, life insurance, and vocational clubs.
Figure 4.5 presents an example of the difference between two CCs when
reranking the population from the hyperbolic discount factor to the patience proxy. The
solid line presents the equality line, the dashed-and-dotted line presents the CC when
ranking by the hyperbolic discount factor, and the dashed line presents the CC when
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ranking by the patience proxy. By visual inspection, these two CCs are quite similar. The
dotted line presents the CC based on reranking to the patience proxy. Since the two CCs
from the hyperbolic discount factor and the patience proxy are quite similar, the
reranking CC lies on the equality line for the most part. Figure 4.6 presents an example of
the difference between two CCs when reranking the population from the hyperbolic
discount factor to the bank account proxy. The dashed-and-dotted line indicates the CC
based on the hyperbolic discount factor and the dashed line presents the CC based on the
rank of the bank account proxy. The former CC slightly lies below the latter. The dotted
line demonstrates the difference in both CCs, which slightly lies above the equality line
for some parts.
Other proxies that exert statistically significant differences between the CIs
overestimate patience. Under hyperbolic time preferences, the proxies of bank account,
maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, and the AFQT overestimate patience by 6, 5, 4.4,
and 5.5%, respectively. Under exponential time preferences, the bank account proxy
overestimates patience by 4.1% and the AFQT proxy overestimates patience by 3.6%.
When practitioners are interested in using other proxies, we suggest that they should
adjust their estimates by 5% (the average bias) against patience under hyperbolic
discounting, and by 4% (the average bias) under exponential discounting.
The performance of time preference proxies among males and females is reported
in Table 4.5. The first three columns present the results for males. Column 1 indicates
that obesity concentrates among impatient men. Column 2 shows the validity of our
proxy when reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor. Except for the life insurance
proxy, other proxies are also valid when reranking from the exponential discount factor
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as shown in column 3. Columns 4-6 in Table 4.5 present the validity of time preference
proxies to explain variations in time preferences among females. As expected, obesity
concentrates among impatient women as shown in column 4. Reranking from the
hyperbolic discount factor to the proxies of patience, smoking, life insurance, or
vocational clubs has no significant effect on the differences between the CIs as reported
in column 5. Column 6 also shows that reranking from the exponential discount factor to
the proxies of patience, maxing out a credit card, smoking, life insurance, or vocational
clubs does not affect the differences between the CIs.
Proxies that exert significant differences in the CIs when reranking from the
elicited discount factors underestimate patience for men but overestimate patience for
women. Among men, reranking from the exponential discount factor to the life insurance
proxy underestimates patience by at least 6%. For women, reranking from the hyperbolic
discount factor to the proxies of bank account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, and
the AFQT overestimates patience by 12.1, 5.6, 7.6, and 7.7%, respectively. Under the
exponential discounting, reranking to the proxies of bank account, bankruptcy, and the
AFQT overestimates patience by 10.5, 5.9, and 6.1%, respectively.
We suggest that practitioners who focus on men should use the proxies of
patience, bank account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, smoking, life insurance, the
AFQT, and vocational clubs. Other proxies can be used without adjustment needed under
hyperbolic discounting, but under exponential discounting, we suggest adjusting
estimates by 6% against impatience. If the focus is on women, we suggest using the
proxies of patience, smoking, life insurance, and vocational clubs, under hyperbolic
discounting. Under exponential discounting, we suggest using the proxies of patience,
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maxing out a credit card, smoking, life insurance, and vocational clubs. If practitioners
want to employ other proxies, we recommend that they should adjust their estimates by
8% against patience under exponential and hyperbolic discounting.
Table 4.6 presents the performance of time preference proxies among the highly
educated and less educated groups. We identify highly educated as those with a college
degree and beyond and the less educated as those with a high school degree or less.
Column 1 presents the CIs for the less educated group. Ranking by the elicited discount
factors does not explain obesity concentration. However, ranking by the proxies of bank
account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, and the AFQT explain obesity
concentration among the impatient. Columns 2 and 3 validate all proxies under
hyperbolic and exponential discounting. Column 4 reports the CIs for the highly educated
group. Except for the patience proxy, other time preference measures indicate the obesity
concentration. Column 5 demonstrates that reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor
to the proxies of bank account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, life insurance, or
the AFQT does not affect the CIs’ differences. Also, reranking from the exponential
discount factor to the proxies of bank account, maxing out a credit card, life insurance, or
the AFQT does not change the CIs as shown in column 6.
If practitioners target the less educated individuals, all proxies are valid. If
targeting the highly educated individuals, we suggest using the proxies of bank account,
maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, life insurance, or the AFQT for hyperbolic
discounting. For exponential discounting, we suggest using the proxies of bank account,
maxing out a credit card, life insurance, or the AFQT. Other proxies can be used to
explain variations in time preferences. Among the less educated individuals, we detect no
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bias based on the differences between the CIs. Nonetheless, for the highly educated
group, proxies that exert significant differences when reranking from the elicited discount
factors to other proxies underestimate patience by 10%, on average. Accordingly, we
suggest adjusting bias against impatience.
We test the performance of time preference proxies among the white and
nonwhite groups as reported in Table 4.7. Column 1 shows the CIs for the nonwhite
group. Except for the patience and smoking proxies, other time preference measures have
the expected patterns. Obesity is common for the nonwhite impatient individuals.
Column 2 shows that reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor to the proxies of bank
account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, smoking, life insurance, vocational clubs,
or the AFQT exerts no statistically significant differences between the CIs. Reranking
from the exponential discounting to the proxies of bankruptcy or vocational clubs also
does not change the CIs as shown in column 3. The CIs for the white race are reported in
column 4. The negative and statistically significant CIs state the concentration of obesity
among the impatient. Reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor validates the
patience and life insurance proxies as shown in column 5. Column 6 demonstrates that
reranking from the exponential discount factor validates the proxies of patience, maxing
out a credit card, life insurance, and vocational clubs.
We suggest that practitioners who target nonwhite individuals should use the
proxies of bank account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, smoking, life insurance,
vocational clubs, or the AFQT, under hyperbolic discounting. When assuming
exponential time preferences, we suggest using the bankruptcy or the vocational clubs
proxy. For the white race, we suggest using the patience or life insurance proxy under
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hyperbolic time preferences and using proxies of patience, maxing out a credit card, life
insurance, or vocational clubs under exponential time preferences. Other proxies generate
bias, underestimating patience for the nonwhite race, by an average of 8 and 5% under
hyperbolic and exponential discounting, respectively. Among the white race, other
proxies also generate bias, overestimating patience by 8 and 6% under hyperbolic and
exponential discounting, respectively. Accordingly, we suggest fixing bias when using
other proxies.
Table 4.8 provides a summary of the validated time preference proxies. However,
the above discussion raises the question, why do these proxies explain variations in time
preferences? One possible explanation is that current situations either in the financial
domain or the health domain lead to the uncertainty about the future, reducing the cost of
forgoing future benefits. Over the health domain, being obese, for example, reduces life
expectancy and so reduces the cost of forgoing future benefits. As a consequence, obese
individuals engage in other impulsive behaviors. We test this theory by changing the
obesity threshold from 30 (kg/ m2) to 25, 35, and 40 (kg/ m2) and investigate the
performance of our time preferences measures as shown in Tables 4.9-11. The premise
for testing this theory is that the magnitudes of the CIs and the number of valid proxies
increase as the obesity threshold increases. Table 4.12 shows the differences between the
magnitude of the CIs and the number of valid proxies for different obesity thresholds.
The incremental increases in the CIs and the number of valid proxies as we increase the
obesity threshold support our theory that being obese reduces the cost of forgoing future
benefit, so individuals engage in other impulsive behaviors.
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Over the financial domain, low income is also supposed to reduce the cost of
forgoing future benefits. J. K. Binkley and Golub (2011) investigate the choices between
healthy and unhealthy types of breakfast cereal, milk, bread, and soft drinks. To control
for the possibility that low-income households cannot afford the healthy options, the
prices within these products are almost identical. The results show that low-income
households choose unhealthy options even if there is no cost incurred to choose the
healthy ones (J. K. Binkley & Golub, 2011). This also explains why smoking is common
among low-income individuals. Despite a cost incurred to buy cigarettes, low-income
individuals think there is nothing to lose in the future in general (J. Binkley, 2010).
Finally, we test whether individuals discount future health outcomes
hyperbolically or exponentially. Table 4.13 shows the reranking from the hyperbolic
discount factor to the exponential discount factor for different obesity thresholds. At 25
(kg/ m2) obesity threshold, reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor to the
exponential discount factor does not affect the difference between the CIs. At 30, 35, and
40 (kg m2) obesity thresholds, individuals with hyperbolic time preferences deviate
toward patience by 2, 4, and 6%, respectively. In other words, the present bias, 𝛽𝛽,

decreases. The positive and significant difference support hyperbolic discounting,
although the increase is minimal. Table 4.14 shows the differences between the
hyperbolic and exponential discount factors for males vs. females, highly educated vs.
less educated, and nonwhite vs. white. Reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor to
the exponential discount factor suggest that males do not deviate, but females deviate
toward patience by 2%. Regarding education entitlement, neither group deviates. The
results for race show that nonwhite and white consumers deviate toward patience by 3%.
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4.6.

Conclusion
Risky health behaviors reflect trade-offs between present gratification and future

benefits. For example, dieting involves a cost of forgoing tasty food to improve future
health. The rate of time preference measures the ability of individuals to delay benefits.
Patient individuals delay benefits, whereas impatient individuals do not. Studies that
investigate the effect of time preferences on health outcomes either elicit or use proxies
for the rate of time preference. The objective of this paper is to validate the use of time
preference proxies. For health outcomes, we focus our analysis on obesity. We use data
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which contains information
that we use as proxies and two hypothetical monetary elicitation questions. The first
question is for a month time horizon, and the second question is for a year time horizon.
Exploiting these two time horizons for the elicitation questions, we investigate hyperbolic
discounting in addition to the constant exponential discounting. The results validate the
use of time preference proxies. Under hyperbolic discounting, we validate the proxies of
patience, smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational clubs in high school. In contrast,
under the exponential discounting, patience, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy,
smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational clubs are also validated as proxies. Other
proxies overestimate patience by 5% under hyperbolic discounting and by 4% under
exponential discounting.
Our proxies are calculated from different years on the NLSY79 and are validated
to explain the effect of time preferences on current obesity status. This suggests that time
preferences might be stable over time (Meier & Sprenger, 2015). Evidence shows that
four-year-olds who delay benefits achieved better scholastic performance and better
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frustration management skills later in life (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). The
validity of our proxies also indicates that impulsive health-related behaviors might be
substitutes, so past smoking explains current obesity, and vice versa (Cawley, 2015). The
stability of time preference over time and the substitutability between health-related risk
behaviors suggest a policy that oriented people delay benefits, so they can invest more in
health rather than quit one risky health behavior such as smoking just to cope with
another such as obesity (Cawley, 2015).
An ongoing discussion is whether individuals discount the future exponentially or
hyperbolically. The results show that individuals deviate toward patience by 2%,
supporting hyperbolic discounting. A two percent deviation is very low, given that the
sample consists of individuals in their mid-ages (41-49 years old). There are two types of
hyperbolic discounters. The first is a naïve agent who is not aware of the conflict between
the rate of time preferences in the near and far future, acting in a way similar to the
exponential discounter. The second is a sophisticated agent who is fully aware of the
inconsistency in time preferences and who uses commitment devices such as not bringing
soda home or shopping more frequently and buying a small amount of food each time
(Scharff, 2009). Our analysis cannot determine whether individuals are naïve and need to
be educated or sophisticated and need to have better commitment devices. However, this
small deviation warrants future research. A limitation of this paper is the focus of obesity
as the health outcome with the uncertainty that the applicability of the results extends to
other health outcomes. Another limitation is assuming that the elicited discount factors
are the correct measures of time preference. These elicited discount factors might be
sensitive to the question formats (Lawless et al., 2013). However, validating the use of
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time preference proxies to explain other health outcomes, as well as validating proxies in
relation to elicited discount factors based on different question formats, also warrant
future research.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for time preference measures
Variable
Mean
S.D.
a
Hyperbolic discount factor (DF1)
0.28
0.34
a
Exponential discount factor (DF2)
0.59
0.25
Patienceb
0.87
0.34
c
Bank account
0.75
0.30
d
Max credit card
0.91
0.28
e
Bankruptcy
0.87
0.34
Smokingf
0.43
0.50
g
Life insurance
0.59
0.30
a
Vocational clubs
0.97
0.07
h
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
51.24
28.91
Observations are weighted using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth sample
weights.
a: N = 6,094
b: N = 5,879
c: N = 6,091
d: N = 5,763
e: N = 5,818
f: N = 6,059
g: N = 6,033
h: N = 5,876
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Table 4.2: Correlations between time preference measures
Variables
DF1
DF2
Hyperbolic discount factors (DF1)
----***
Exponential discount factors (DF2)
0.58
--Patience
0.01
0.01
Bank account
0.10***
0.11***
Max credit card
0.06***
0.05***
Bankruptcy
0.00
0.02*
Smoking
0.01
0.03**
Life insurance
0.05***
0.04***
Vocational clubs
0.03**
0.03**
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
0.11***
0.13***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, observations are weighted using the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth sample weights.
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics of individuals’ characteristics
Variables
Mean
S.D.
Body Mass Index (BMI)
28.04
5.58
Obesity prevalence
0.29
0.46
BMI beyond 30 (kg/m2)
1.41
3.36
Age (years)
44.86
2.30
Male
0.53
0.50
Hispanic
0.06
0.24
Black
0.13
0.34
White
0.81
0.40
High school degree
0.41
0.49
Some college
0.24
0.42
College graduate and above
0.28
0.45
Married
0.64
0.48
Average working hours per week
35.81
19.56
Net household income ($10,000)
8.29
8.40
White collar occupation
0.55
0.50
Blue collar occupation
0.23
0.42
Service occupation
0.10
0.30
Certainty equivalent
4796.28
3258.23
Observations are weighted using the National Longitudinal Survey for Youth sample
weights. N = 6,094
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Figure 4.1: The concentration curve for the impatient
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Figure 4.2: The concentration curve for the patient
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Table 4.4: Validating time preference proxies
Time preference measures

Obesity

Reranking
from DF1 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(2)

CI
(1)
-0.118***
Hyperbolic discount factor (DF1)
--(0.018)
Exponential discount factor
-0.138***
--(DF2)
(0.017)
-0.105***
-0.013
Patience
(0.019)
(0.022)
-0.178***
0.060***
Bank account
(0.018)
(0.022)
-0.168***
0.050**
Max credit card
(0.018)
(0.021)
-0.162***
0.044*
Bankruptcy
(0.019)
(0.024)
-0.107***
-0.012
Smoking
(0.020)
(0.025)
-0.106***
-0.012
Life insurance
(0.020)
(0.026)
-0.114***
-0.005
Vocational clubs
(0.019)
(0.030)
Armed Forces Qualification Test
-0.174***
0.055***
(AFQT)
(0.018)
(0.021)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
N = 6,094
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Reranking
from DF2 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(3)
-----0.032
(0.022)
0.041**
(0.018)
0.031
(0.019)
0.025
(0.020)
-0.031
(0.021)
-0.031
(0.022)
-0.024
(0.030)
0.036**
(0.017)
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Figure 4.3: The concentration curves based on ranking the population by the hyperbolic
and exponential discount factors
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Figure 4.4: The concentration curves based on ranking the population by the patience and
bank account proxies

0

.2

.4
.6
Cumulative population rank

.8

Rank of the patience proxy
Equality line
Rank of the bank account proxy

109

1

0

.2

Cumulative obesity
.4
.6
.8

1

Figure 4.5: The difference in the concentration curves based on reranking the population
from the hyperbolic discount factor to the patience proxy
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Figure 4.6: The difference in the concentration curves based on reranking the population
from the hyperbolic discount factor to the bank proxy
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Table 4.5: Validating time preference proxies among males and females
Malea
Time preference measures

Obesity

Reranking
from DF1 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(2)

Femaleb
Reranking
from DF2 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(3)
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CI
(1)
Hyperbolic discount factor
-0.112***
----(DF1)
(0.024)
Exponential discount factor
-0.115***
----(DF2)
(0.022)
-0.114***
0.002
-0.000
Patience
(0.022)
(0.027)
(0.023)
-0.114***
0.002
-0.001
Bank account
(0.025)
(0.031)
(0.024)
-0.114***
0.003
-0.000
Max credit card
(0.023)
(0.030)
(0.028)
-0.108***
-0.004
-0.007
Bankruptcy
(0.026)
(0.036)
(0.029)
-0.109***
-0.002
-0.005
Smoking
(0.028)
(0.033)
(0.027)
-0.058**
-0.053
-0.056**
Life insurance
(0.028)
(0.034)
(0.028)
-0.128***
0.016
0.013
Vocational clubs
(0.028)
(0.033)
(0.028)
Armed Forces Qualification
-0.144***
0.032
0.029
Test (AFQT)
(0.025)
(0.031)
(0.025)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: N = 3,059
b: N = 3,035

Obesity
CI
(4)
-0.117***
(0.025)
-0.133***
(0.023)
-0.158***
(0.024)
-0.238***
(0.025)
-0.173***
(0.023)
-0.192***
(0.026)
-0.106***
(0.028)
-0.131***
(0.026)
-0.096***
(0.027)
-0.194***
(0.026)

Reranking
from DF1 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(5)

Reranking
from DF2 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(6)

---

---

0.041
(0.030)
0.121***
(0.031)
0.056**
(0.026)
0.076**
(0.032)
-0.011
(0.036)
0.014
(0.036)
-0.021
(0.028)
0.077***
(0.028)

0.025
(0.026)
0.105***
(0.027)
0.040
(0.025)
0.059**
(0.027)
-0.027
(0.031)
-0.002
(0.032)
-0.037
(0.025)
0.061**
(0.024)

---

---

Table 4.6: Validating time preference proxies among highly and less educated
Less educateda
Time preference measures

Obesity

Reranking
from DF1 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(2)

Highly educatedb
Reranking
from DF2 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(3)
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CI
(1)
Hyperbolic discount factor
-0.024
--(DF1)
(0.023)
Exponential discount factor
-0.031
--(DF2)
(0.021)
-0.029
0.005
Patience
(0.022)
(0.031)
-0.050***
0.026
Bank account
(0.019)
(0.030)
-0.071***
0.047
Max credit card
(0.023)
(0.030)
-0.056***
0.032
Bankruptcy
(0.021)
(0.034)
0.003
-0.028
Smoking
(0.018)
(0.032)
-0.010
-0.015
Life insurance
(0.023)
(0.034)
0.013
-0.038
Vocational clubs
(0.022)
(0.029)
Armed Forces Qualification
-0.046***
0.022
Test (AFQT)
(0.014)
(0.027)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: N = 3,059
b: N = 3,194

-----

-0.002
(0.030)
0.020
(0.024)
0.041
(0.027)
0.026
(0.028)
-0.034
(0.027)
-0.021
(0.028)
-0.044
(0.027)
0.016
(0.021)

Obesity
CI
(4)
-0.141***
(0.036)
-0.160***
(0.034)
-0.028
(0.027)
-0.176***
(0.031)
-0.158***
(0.029)
-0.089***
(0.018)
-0.065***
(0.025)
-0.127***
(0.045)
-0.045**
(0.017)
-0.116***
(0.017)

Reranking
from DF1 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(5)

Reranking
from DF2 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(6)

---

---

-0.114***
(0.043)
0.035
(0.046)
0.017
(0.039)
-0.053
(0.038)
-0.077*
(0.045)
-0.015
(0.063)
-0.096***
(0.036)
-0.025
(0.036)

-0.132***
(0.044)
0.016
(0.038)
-0.002
(0.032)
-0.071**
(0.030)
-0.096**
(0.037)
-0.034
(0.053)
-0.115***
(0.031)
-0.044
(0.029)

---

---

Table 4.7: Validating time preference proxies among white and nonwhite
Nonwhitea
Time preference measures

Obesity

Reranking
from DF1 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(2)

Whiteb
Reranking
from DF2 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(3)
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CI
(1)
Hyperbolic discount factor
-0.057***
----(DF1)
(0.013)
Exponential discount factor
-0.088***
----(DF2)
(0.016)
0.025
-0.082***
-0.113***
Patience
(0.019)
(0.022)
(0.023)
-0.049***
-0.008
-0.039**
Bank account
(0.013)
(0.016)
(0.016)
-0.057***
0.000
-0.031*
Max credit card
(0.011)
(0.017)
(0.017)
-0.090***
0.033
0.002
Bankruptcy
(0.020)
(0.021)
(0.020)
-0.029
-0.028
-0.059***
Smoking
(0.021)
(0.022)
(0.021)
-0.046**
-0.011
-0.042*
Life insurance
(0.022)
(0.023)
(0.023)
-0.058***
0.001
-0.030
Vocational clubs
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.020)
Armed Forces Qualification
-0.043***
-0.014
-0.045***
Test (AFQT)
(0.013)
(0.016)
(0.016)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: N = 2,966
b: N = 3,128

Obesity
CI
(4)
-0.054**
(0.022)
-0.084***
(0.021)
-0.091***
(0.026)
-0.142***
(0.024)
-0.112***
(0.022)
-0.159***
(0.026)
-0.151***
(0.026)
-0.104***
(0.026)
-0.112***
(0.026)
-0.132***
(0.024)

Reranking
from DF1 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(5)

Reranking
from DF2 to
other proxies
ΔCI
(6)

---

---

0.036
(0.029)
0.088***
(0.030)
0.058**
(0.029)
0.105***
(0.032)
0.097***
(0.029)
0.050
(0.033)
0.057**
(0.027)
0.077***
(0.029)

0.006
(0.029)
0.058**
(0.024)
0.028
(0.026)
0.075***
(0.026)
0.067***
(0.025)
0.020
(0.028)
0.027
(0.025)
0.047**
(0.024)

---

---

Table 4.8: A summary of the validated time preference proxies
Time preference proxies
Patience
Bank account
Max credit card
Bankruptcy
Smoking
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Life insurance
Vocational clubs
Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT)

Discounting
Hyperbolic
Exponential
Hyperbolic
Exponential
Hyperbolic
Exponential
Hyperbolic
Exponential
Hyperbolic
Exponential
Hyperbolic
Exponential
Hyperbolic
Exponential
Hyperbolic
Exponential

All

Male

Female

(1)
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

(2)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(3)
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

Less
educated
(4)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Highly
educated
(5)
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

Nonwhite

White

(6)
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

(7)
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

Table 4.9: Validating time preference proxies setting the obesity threshold equal to 25
(kg/m2)
Reranking
Reranking
Obesity
from DF1 to
from DF2 to
other proxies
other proxies
Time preference measures
CI
ΔCI
ΔCI
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.074***
Hyperbolic discount factor (DF1)
----(0.010)
Exponential discount factor
-0.075***
----(DF2)
(0.009)
-0.090***
0.016
0.014
Patience
(0.010)
(0.012)
(0.012)
-0.110***
0.036***
0.034***
Bank account
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.010)
-0.099***
0.025**
0.024**
Max credit card
(0.010)
(0.012)
(0.011)
-0.096***
0.022*
0.021*
Bankruptcy
(0.010)
(0.013)
(0.011)
-0.063***
-0.011
-0.013
Smoking
(0.011)
(0.013)
(0.011)
-0.052***
-0.022*
-0.024**
Life insurance
(0.011)
(0.013)
(0.011)
-0.081***
0.007
0.005
Vocational clubs
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.010)
Armed Forces Qualification Test
-0.109***
0.036***
0.034***
(AFQT)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.009)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
N = 6,094
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Table 4.10: Validating time preference proxies setting the obesity threshold equal to 35
(kg/m2)
Reranking
Reranking
Obesity
from DF1 to
from DF2 to
other proxies
other proxies
Time preference measures
CI
ΔCI
ΔCI
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.147***
Hyperbolic discount factor (DF1)
----(0.029)
Exponential discount factor
-0.185***
----(DF2)
(0.027)
-0.141***
-0.006
-0.044
Patience
(0.034)
(0.039)
(0.037)
-0.237***
0.090**
0.052*
Bank account
(0.032)
(0.040)
(0.031)
-0.182***
0.035
-0.003
Max credit card
(0.031)
(0.037)
(0.031)
-0.192***
0.045
0.007
Bankruptcy
(0.034)
(0.043)
(0.034)
-0.153***
0.005
-0.032
Smoking
(0.035)
(0.045)
(0.038)
-0.162***
0.015
-0.022
Life insurance
(0.035)
(0.046)
(0.038)
-0.113***
-0.034
-0.071**
Vocational clubs
(0.033)
(0.037)
(0.033)
Armed Forces Qualification Test
-0.219***
0.072*
0.034
(AFQT)
(0.032)
(0.038)
(0.030)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
N = 6,094
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Table 4.11: Validating time preference proxies setting the obesity threshold equal to 40
(kg/m2)
Reranking
Reranking
Obesity
from DF1 to
from DF2 to
other proxies
other proxies
Time preference measures
CI
ΔCI
ΔCI
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.155***
Hyperbolic discount factor (DF1)
----(0.045)
Exponential discount factor
-0.216***
----(DF2)
(0.042)
-0.172***
0.016
-0.044
Patience
(0.057)
(0.064)
(0.059)
-0.296***
0.140**
0.080
Bank account
(0.054)
(0.068)
(0.052)
-0.179***
0.024
-0.036
Max credit card
(0.052)
(0.062)
(0.050)
-0.210***
0.054
-0.006
Bankruptcy
(0.057)
(0.073)
(0.055)
-0.208***
0.053
-0.008
Smoking
(0.061)
(0.077)
(0.063)
-0.230***
0.074
0.014
Life insurance
(0.061)
(0.078)
(0.065)
-0.068
-0.088
-0.148***
Vocational clubs
(0.054)
(0.062)
(0.054)
Armed Forces Qualification Test
-0.254***
0.099
0.039
(AFQT)
(0.055)
(0.064)
(0.049)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
N = 6,094
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Table 4.12: The magnitude of the CIs and the number of valid proxies for different
obesity thresholds
The number of valid
Concentration Index
proxies
Obesity threshold
Maximum
Minimum Hyperbolic Exponential
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
25 (kg/m2) obesity threshold

-0.052

-0.109

3

3

30 (kg/m2) obesity threshold

-0.105

-0.178

4

6

35 (kg/m2) obesity threshold

-0.113

-0.219

6

6

40 (kg/m2) obesity threshold

-0.155

-0.296

7

7
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Table 4.13: Hyperbolic time preferences vs. exponential time preferences
Reranking from the hyperbolic to
the exponential discount factor
Obesity threshold
ΔCI
0.002
25 (kg/m2) obesity threshold
(0.004)
0.019**
30 (kg/m2) obesity threshold
(0.008)
0.038***
35 (kg/m2) obesity threshold
(0.014)
0.060**
40 (kg/m2) obesity threshold
(0.025)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
N = 6,094
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Table 4.14: Hyperbolic time preferences vs. exponential time preferences for different
groups
Reranking from the hyperbolic to
the exponential discount factor
Obesity threshold
ΔCI
0.003
Malea
(0.012)
0.016**
Femaleb
(0.008)
0.006
Less educatedc
(0.011)
0.019
Highly educatedd
(0.017)
0.031***
Nonwhitee
(0.006)
0.030***
Whitef
(0.010)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: N = 3,059
b: N = 3,035
c: N = 3,059
d: N = 3,194
e: N = 2,966
f: N = 3,128
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Chapter 5:

Conclusion

This dissertation discusses three essays in food consumption and health-related
issues. The first essay discusses Food-Away-From-Home (FAFH) consumption. We
hypothesize that consumers compensate for the high caloric intake typically associated
with FAFH by changing their behaviors during other meals. We use data from the 200910 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). The NHANES
provides information on food intake for two nonconsecutive days. On day one,
consumers were personally interviewed, and on day two consumers were interviewed by
phone. The NHANES asked consumers about their beliefs regarding FAFH, which
allows us to elaborate on the cognitive aspects of the compensating behavior. There is a
consensus among consumers that FAFH is less nutritious than food cooked at home.
Despite this, consumers still demand FAFH for other reasons like price, convenience, or
socializing. We use the theory of cognitive dissonance to explain how this inconsistency
of consumers’ beliefs and actions creates a state of cognitive dissonance. To resolve
dissonance, consumers compensate for FAFH by changing their behaviors during other
meals in the day.
We limit the analysis to individuals for whom we obtained information about
beliefs and exploit the panel nature of the NHANES, employing a fixed effect estimator
to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity
results in a downward bias for the compensatory behavior. The results show that
consumers ingest more calories away from home than they do at home but compensate
for the excessive caloric intake from FAFH during other meals.
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We also run two tests for the robustness of the consistency of our results with the
theory of cognitive dissonance. First, FAFH is high in addictive food components, sugar,
salt, fat, and carbohydrates. If addiction prevents the compensating behavior, the results
are inconsistent with the theory of cognitive dissonance. The analysis states the
compensating behavior for the high amount of sugar, salt, fat, and carbohydrates from
FAFH. Second, we perform a placebo test to estimate the effect of plain water on energy
consumption. It is implausible to expect drinking water to create a conflict between
beliefs and action like FAFH. The results for plain water are statistically insignificant.
Overall, these two tests provide evidence of the consistency of our results with the theory
of cognitive dissonance.
Essay II discusses the mindless and the mindfulness of secondary eating.
Secondary eating is that which occurs while doing other activities like driving or
watching TV. When someone engages in secondary eating, he or she might overeat and
gain weight. Essay II tests the effect of secondary eating on obesity. We identify
situations when secondary eating is positively related to obesity (mindless secondary
eating) and cases where secondary eating is negatively related to obesity (mindful
secondary eating). We hypothesize that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating
on obesity.
We use data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). A subsample of the
Current Population Survey (CPS) was randomly selected to provide diaries for 24 hours.
The Eating and Health Module contains information on secondary eating. The results
show that spending more time doing sedentary activities that require lying and sitting
increases the odds of mindless secondary eating. Furthermore, eating while doing highly
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sedentary activities that mostly involves lying or sitting increases the chances for
mindless secondary eating as opposed to eating while doing less sedentary activities that
require some movements.
Essay III validates the use of time preference proxies to estimate the effect of time
preferences on health outcomes. To determine the effect of time preferences on health
outcomes, researchers either elicit the rate of time preference or use proxies. This paper
determines if variations in elicited discount rates correspond to variations in time
preference proxies in the estimation of health outcomes. For health outcome, we focus
our analysis on obesity. We utilize data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY79), which provides information that can be used as proxies as well as two
elicitation questions. The first elicitation question is over a month horizon, and the
second is over a year horizon. We exploit the differences over time for the elicitation
questions to validate proxies under the fixed exponential discounting and hyperbolic
discounting. The results confirm the use of time preference proxies in the estimation of
health outcomes. Under hyperbolic discounting, we validate the proxies of patience,
smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational clubs in high school. Under exponential
discounting, we also validate the proxies of patience, maxing out a credit card,
bankruptcy, smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational clubs. Other proxies
overestimate patience by 5% under hyperbolic discounting and by 4% under exponential
discounting.
To reduce obesity, consumers must balance between energy consumption and
expenditure. Eating FAFH does not entail a poor diet and obesity, and eating at home
does not automatically assure a better diet and healthy weight. Similarly, it is of less
124

importance whether eating is the primary or secondary task when consumers maintain a
balanced diet. A balanced diet reflects the willpower to forgo present gratifications for
future benefits. Understanding why consumers lack such willpower is essential to help
people balance between energy consumption and expenditure. For example, if the present
bias is relatively high, consumers might engage in some commitment devices, such as
keeping healthy options at home to assure the compensating behavior for FAFH or
preparing a limited amount of food to reduce any possibility of overeating when eating
occurs while doing other activities. Finally, future research should consider the
interdependence of FAFH, secondary eating, and time preferences in the examination of
obesity causes. Since people eat several meals throughout the day, the rate of time
preference might change from one meal to another, so they might overeat when the
present bias is high and compensate when the present bias is low. The availability of
FAFH may contribute to the increased time of mindless secondary eating. Perhaps, time
preferences determine lifestyle as well as the effect of secondary eating on obesity.
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